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Prologue
Faust.

What is your name?

Mephistopheles. Small, Sir, The question seems
From one who gives the Word its lowest rate,
Who, far removed from semblances and dreams,
Only the depth of life will contemplate.
Faust.

the nature of you doubtful gentleman
Nomenclature may help to recognize,
As may be seen specifically when
We say Destroyer, Prince of Flies, lies.
Who then are you?

Mephistopheles. Part of a power that would
Alone work evil, but engenders good.
Faust.

What hidden meaning in this riddle lies?

Mephistopheles.

The spirit I, that endless denies.

Goethe's Faust
(Part I)

INTRODUCTION
The ground of our interrogation is strictly directed
to what is only implicit in Freud's literature:
of denial as vice.

the theme

Our main concern is to show how Freud

came to understand denial and how the notion of denial
carries within itself an ethical problem.

Understanding

this implicit ethical problem we decided to draw out what
is parallel and similar between Freud's writings on
neurosis and psychosis and the philosophical perspectives
of Aristotle's writings on ethics.
By attempting to explicate the direction of our
investigation we promise neither an absolute clarity nor a
new system in ethics.

What we hope to achieve is a partial

success; for the ambiguities inherent in Freud's text act
as a stumbling block as we relate it to the field of ethics
in general and Aristotle's in particular.

As Freud teaches

us we need to work "step by step" without overburdening
ourselves with the "need" for an immediate completion.

So,

let us consider this investigation as a response to the
invitation of many philosophers and psychologists, such as
Jacques Lacan, Paul Ricoeur, William Richardson, etc. to
turn back to Freud's psychoanalysis and attempt to evaluate
its contributions; it might add an indispensable novelty to
any intellectual and practical endeavors.
1
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The first chapter attempts to define denial as a
mechanism which occurs in states of psychosis, neurosis and
normality.

This is an application of Freud's perspectives

on the two major different opposing directions the psychic
energy tends to traverse:

regression and progression.

considering these two directions, we will show the
differences which characterize regression in normal
development and those which characterize neurotic and
psychotic denial.
The second chapter attempts to draw the framework of
the major question:
answer is yes.

Can we consider denial as vice?

The

In order to develop our investigation,

Aristotle's writings on ethics are considered in relation
to the psychological writings of Freud.

This relation is

taken into account on the basis of finding the common
places between Freud and Aristotle.

Aristotle's three

major notions of the excessive, the mean and the deficient
are going to be related to the functions of the id, ego and
superego as Freud sees their excessive and deficient
functions conducive to sickness or health.

Given the

similarities between Freud and Aristotle we will come to
understand how both seriously take into account that which
"ruins" health and the person's relation to the external
world.
Chapter three is an answer to this question:
we encounter denial in an educational setting?

how do

Three

3

inextricably interwoven symptomatic notions are to be
considered:

separateness, anxiety and perception.

considering them separately, we will show how the
regressive phenomenon of denial has negative effects on the
student's function as a social being.

Being intimately

connected, we will see how anxiety is a phenomenon of
separateness originated in the child's experience of the
absence of the mother which in turn is experienced as
danger.

We will also see how denial results in distortions

and inaccuracies in perceiving the external world.
The fourth chapter answers the following question:
What are some of the virtues implied in Freud's
psychoanalysis?

In order to see this implicit side three

important notions are to be discussed:

common sense,

psychopathology and the theory of cure.

These three

notions unfold the perspective that to be an articulate
person is the weapon against vice.

They also show us that

functioning well is the heart of virtue; and functioning
well is a tendency in the psyche which counteracts any
conscious or unconscious malfunctions.

In other words, we

will see how building the virtues is what keeps the harmony
between inherent pathology and inherent health.

To

substantiate our discussion, again, we will consider
Aristotle's writings on ethics as evidence to what we will
prove.
Finally, what is left is to acknowledge the fact that

4
investigating the relationship between philosophy and
psychoanalysis is still in its infancy.

If by any chance

our research proves to be "partout et nulle part," i.e.,
neither satisfies the psychologist nor the philosopher, we
should not be discouraged, instead we should follow what
Freud teaches us that we should consider things step by
step and never hesitate to reconsider the same phenomenon
again and again.

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to define the notion of
denial in Freud's literature.

Undoubtedly, defining a

notion aims at "clarity of understanding," and it also aims
at drawing the line of demarcation in a distinct fashion.
In other words, explanation becomes an important factor in
contributing to the field of "knowledge," and in clarifying
the meaning of denial and its characteristics as
distinguished from other notions.

But, it may be

disappointing to find out that some ambiguities and some
confusions are evident in Freud's texts which may lead the
investigator to pose unanswered questions.

Due to his

authentic scientific approach, Freud admits this fact and
leaves these ambiguities and confusions liable for future
clarifications.
It is almost humiliating that, after working so
long, we should still be having difficulties in
understanding the most fundamental facts.

But we

have made up our minds to simplify nothing and to
hide nothing.

If we cannot see things clearly we

will at least see clearly what the obscurities

5
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are. 1
The presence of ambiguities should not discourage us.
on the contrary, they are sources of "excitement" as a
means of discovering the "beyond."

Without this excitement

our search to uncover the truth would be dull and boring.
confronting these ambiguities and confusions we might
"limp" without being capable of "flying."

That said, in

addition to many sub-questions, two major questions should
be answered:

1) What is denial according to Freud?

2) What is the context in which Freud came to tackle this
important notion?

I will start with the latter.

The Context
Freud found himself in an enigmatic position in
explicating his crucial notion of the unconscious.

In the

last section of his paper "The Unconscious" he acknowledges
the fact that the results of his discussion of the
unconscious is rather unclear.

"It is certainly not much,

and at some points it gives an impression of obscurity and
confusion. 11 2

This impasse brought him to search for

another alternative by which a proper and a clearer
explanation could be attained.
appeal to schizophrenia.
1.

So, he made an interruptive

He says, "It is only the analysis

s.

Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Trans & ed. J.
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, from 1953), v. xx, p.
124.

2.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. V. XIV, p. 196.

7

of schizophrenia that promises to furnish us with
conceptions through which the enigmatic unconscious will pe
brought more within the reach 113 . . . "[It] is
indispensable for a general understanding of the
unconscious. 11 4

The important position of schizophrenia is

its " ..• reference to the anti-thesis between ego and
object. 11 5

Considering the importance of the ego in

relation to its object, in schizophrenia, the regression
extends "not merely to narcissism but to a complete
abandonment of object-love and a return to infantile autoeroticism.116

It is worth noting that regression according

to Freud is nothing "than a name (for) an inexplicable
phenomenon. 11 7

This suggests that regression has unknown

implications.
Now, what is this infantile-eroticism?

Originally,

Freud says that the infant exists in a state of an
"undifferentiated immediacy."

This means that the infant

cannot distinguish between the ego and the object; "to
start with, the child certainly makes no distinction
between the breast and his own body. 118
3.

s. Freud, Standard Edition,

4.

Ibid. p. 203.

5.

Ibid. p. 196.

6.

s. Freud, standard Edition,

7.

s. Freud, standard Edition,

8.

s. Freud, standard Edition,

v.

In other words, the

XIV, p. 196.

v. XII, p. 77.
v. v. , p. 543.
v. XXIII, p. 188.

8
119
ego "includes everything.

The ego is the world.

This is

to say that the breast of the mother is the infant's world
and the infant's world is the breast of the mother.

It is

a state of unified presence in one unified world., i.e., a
"psychical rest."
Realization of the External World
What does this tell us?
of "helplessness."

1) The infant is in a state

2) The infant is unilaterally dependent

on an external reality which he is not aware of as external
to himself.

3) As a result the necessity of external

reality imposes itself as a factor of separation between
the infant and his mother.

Gradually, the infant starts to

notice the absence or the separation:

" ... When the breast

has to be separated" Freud says, "from his body and shifted
to the 'outside' because he so often finds it absent, it
carries with it now that it is an 'object' a part of the
original narcissistic cathexis. 11 10

Thus for the first

time, the infant realizes that there is something existing
"outside."

The emergence of the external world starts to

have an impact on the infant.

The infant starts to realize

his own dependence on this outside world which starts with
the need for the mother.

Then, what happens?

To go into details is not the purpose of this chapter.
Suffice to outline the main points of Freud's description
9.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XXI, p. 68.

10.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XXIII, p. 188.

9

of this important transition period.

This is stated as it

appears in the last section of the Interpretation of
Qreams.

1) Internal needs such as hunger or thirst appear.

2 ) The satisfaction of these needs is attained by either
the mother or by "hallucination."

3) The unavoidable

internal needs and their satisfaction by either the mother
or by hallucination show that the infant acts under the
influence of a spontaneous reflex apparatus.

According to

Freud, these three stages obey the "pleasure principle."
They are called the "primary process."

4) Hallucination

comes to a point when it proves to be unsatisfactory to the
infant.
emerges.

Consequently, the reality testing principle
This is called the "secondary process."

obeys the law of the

11

unpleasure principle."

This

How the

unpleasure principle emerges is ambiguous in Freud's
thought.
What does Freud imply by the unpleasure principle?
The state of the "psychical rest" mentioned before implies
a purpose of staying in this "Nirvana" by avoiding
stimulation from the external world.

But, according to

Freud, these internal needs are not "operative 11 without the
stimulation from the external world which impinges on the
infant's "reflex system."

To be faithful to the "Nirvana"

state, these stimulations are avoided by reflex activities,
such as kicking and screaming by which the infant calls the
mother in order to restore the lost unity.

Freud considers

10
these reflex activities as "motor flight."

These automatic

spontaneous activities Freud describes as "an original
attempt at flight from the external world with its emission
of stimuli. 11 11

Yet, one must bear in mind that this

"psychic rest" not only receives or is disturbed by
external stimulation.
instinctual needs.

It is also disturbed by internal

In this regard, the infant is caught up

by the inner stimulation and the outer stimulation.

This

state is clearly expressed in "Instincts" in the form of an
invented case.
Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an
almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet
unoriented in the world, which is receiving
stimuli in its nervous substance.

This organism

will very soon be in a position to make a first
distinction and a first orientation.

On the one

hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be
avoided by muscular action (flight); these
ascribe to our external world.

On the other

hand, it will also be aware of stimuli against
which such action is of no avail and whose
character of constant pressure persists in spite
of it.

These stimuli are the signs of our

internal world, the evidence of instinctual
needs.
11.

s.

The perceptual substance of the living

Freud, Standard Edition,

v.

XIV, p. 136.

11
organism will thus have found in the efficacy of
its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing
between an •outside' and an 'inside. 1 12
Having in mind what we mentioned about the auto-erotic
stage or the 'Nirvana' state, this crucial state is called
by Freud "the original reality ego."

This differs from the

reality testing ego which is developed upon the impinging
of stimulations from the external world.

What is really

important is that this confrontation with the external
world assures a series of complex inner interrelated
activities whose main objective is to change the external
world.

This is what really led Freud to conclude that

instincts are "the true motive forces behind the advances
[which] have led the nervous system, with its unlimited
capacities, to its present high level of development. 11 13
In this sense, the high level of development is meant to
be, we think, in the Freudian sense, the capacity to have
the "passage" to the external world.

In other words, the

infant "takes into itself," "incorporates," "introjects,"
"devours," and "establishes one identification" with the
object.

Yet, the infant "expels," "projects" and "throws

outside" all that gives rise to unpleasurable feelings.
Freud expresses this in his paper on Negation:
Expressed in the language of the oldest ... the
12.

Ibid.

13.

Ibid., p. 120.

I

p. 119.

12
oral ••. instinctual impulse, the judgement is:
'I should like to eat this' or 'I should like to
spit it out'; and put more generally:

'I should

like to take this into myself and to keep that
out.'

That is to say:

"It shall be inside me'

or 'it shall be outside me.'

As I have shown

elsewhere, the original pleasure ego wants to
introject into itself everything that is good and
to eject from itself everything that is bad.14
From the above discussion we come to know that the
infant moves onward from a state of oneness with the mother
(auto-erotic) to a state of separation from the mother
which is fundamental to the formation of the ego testing of
the external reality.

In the Ego and the Id, Freud

explains in detail the ego as "essentially the
representation of the external world."15
know that in

We also come to

schizophrenia there is a psychotic wishful

attempt to regress back to this "Nirvana" state by
detaching oneself from the external world.

This separation

from the external world is similar to the separation of the
infant from his or her mother which in turn gives rise to
hallucination as an attempt to restore again the lost
relationship.

In the following section we will introduce

further explanation of schizophrenia as an extreme case of
14.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIX, p. 236-237.

15.

Ibid., p. 25.

13

denial.

The theme of schizophrenia became important as a

means to overcome the difficulties Freud encountered
concerning the unconscious.

The question is, what are the

characteristics of schizophrenia that Freud thought of as
valuable in understanding the unconscious?

In order to

answer the question let us first state the precise
difference Freud gave between the conscious and the
unconscious as an answer to the question he had posed at
the beginning of "The Unconscious":
we now seem to know all at once what the
difference

i~

between a conscious and an

unconscious presentation.

The two are not, as we

supposed, different psychical localities, nor yet
different functional states of cathexis in the
same locality; but the conscious presentation
comprises the presentation of the thing plus the
presentation of the word belonging to it, while
the unconscious presentation is the presentation
of the thing alone."16
In regard to this difference between the unconscious and
the conscious, a pathological state means a failure in
"translating" the "thing presentations" into "word
presentations" which in their normal conditions remain in
contact with the object.
So, how do we see schizophrenia in this context?
16.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition,

v.

XIV, p. 204.

In

14

this context, the origin of schizophrenia, according to
Freud, is a "dispositional fixation" that "lies somewhere
at the beginning of the course of development from autoeroticism to object-love. 1117

This is to say, at the

beginning the object-love is not differentiated by the
infant.

In other words, the object-love is "me" and the

infant is unable to draw the line of demarcation which is
represented by "I am not it."

In his paper:"Psychoanalytic

Notes on the Autobiographical Account of a Case of
Paranoia," Freud provides us with the case of Schreber who
came to speak of an internal catastrophe and a belief that
the end of the world is at hand.

In this state of mind,

Schreber showed detachment from things he previously loved
and from people.

This state of detachment is called by

Freud "the survival of the self alone."
detachment from the external world.

It is a state of a

Although this case

shows Schreber as paranoic, yet, as a matter of degree a
schizophrenic shows an extreme detachment from the external
world.

The schizophrenic shows the following:

1)

Gives up object cathexis.

2)

Returns to a primitive objectless condition of
auto-eroticism.

3)

Exhibits to a great degree disorganized and
incomprehensible sentences.

4)
17.

Refers to bodily organs.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, XII p. 77.

15

S)

utters words that predominate over what has to do
with things, i.e., cathexis on word presentations
rather than thing presentations.

6)

Treats concrete things as though they were
abstract.

7)

Denies external reality.

8)

Hallucinates to restore what was lost.

Having these characteristics in mind, we notice that there
is a split between the two worlds.
is broken.

The link between them

In "The Unconscious," Freud maintains, "What we

have permissibly called conscious presentation of the
object now be split up into the presentation of the word
and the presentation of the thing. 11 18

Freud does not

elucidate the different mechanics in a psychotic disavowal
of external reality.

He says that the "elucidation of the

various mechanisms which are designed, in the psychoses, to
turn the subject away from reality and to reconstruct
reality--this is a task for specialized psychiatric study
which has not yet been taken at hand. 11 19

What is really

shown in Freud's comment is a problem that demands a clear
expression.

A concept would be much clearer if we contrast

it with other concepts.

That said, one still feels that

obtaining an absolute clarity in Freud's literature could
be disappointing.

The notions are overlapped and

18.

s. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIV, p. 204.

19.

s. Freud, standard Edition,

v.

XIX, p. 186.

16

ambiguities are inevitable.

The least we can do is to try.

If our try will prove fruitless, all we can say is that it
is worth the try.

Let us start with the differences

between neurosis and psychosis.

It is worth noting that

neither the term "denial" nor "disavowal" is used in
"Neurosis and Psychosis" nor in the "Ego and the Id."

But

what is really important is to decipher the text and try to
find out what is implicit rather than what is only
explicit.

In "The Ego and the Id," Freud specifies the

difference between neurosis and psychosis:

"

..• neurosis is
•

t

the result of a conflict between the ego and its id,
whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar
disturbance in the relations of the ego and the external
world."20
one.

Freud specifies this difference as a "genetic"

Moreover, neurosis, according to Freud, maintains its

dependence on the external world.

In schizophrenia there

is "a loss of all participation in the external world. 11 21
As to the notion of disavowal or denial, in "Narcissism,"
Freud maintains that " •.• neurosis does not disavow reality,
it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to
replace it.n22
But Freud modifies his perspective on neurosis and
psychosis.

In psychosis, Freud claims that the detachment

20.

Ibid., p. 149.

21.

Ibid. p. 151.

22.

Ibid. p. 185.
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from external reality is "rarely if ever complete."
does this happen?

ae

How

Freud refers it to a split in the mind.

says,
Two mental attitudes have been formed instead of
a single one ••• the normal one, which takes
account of reality, and another which under the
influence of the instincts detaches the ego from
reality.

The two exist alongside of each other.

The issue depends upon their relative strength.
If the second is or becomes the stronger the
necessary condition for a psychosis is
present. 11 23
This also applies to neurosis.

In fetishism as well as in

some other forms of neurosis, denial of the external world
is "half measures, incomplete attempts at detachment from
reality. 11 24

This denial of the external world is "always

supplemented by an acceptance. 11 25
an overlapping of issues.

It seems that there is

A neurotic person and a

psychotic person suffer from a split in the ego.

What is

really the difference, we think, is only a matter of
degree.

Psychosis is an extreme form of denial and

neurosis is a less extreme form of denial.

Yet, we notice

that there is a "continuity" between the two mental
23.

Ibid. p. 202.

24.

Ibid. p. 204.

25.

Ibid.

18

sicknesses.

Unfortunately, Freud does not clearly specify

the total distinction.
Although he discusses the notion of the split in the
ego as it appears in his unfinished paper "Splitting of the
Ego," in his "Outline of Psychoanalysis," and in other
papers, the notion of denial was treated.

But for Freud,

as the proverb says, "plus tard aue jamais" is beneficial.
In his paper "Fetishism," the notion of denial becomes the
center of his discussion.

In this paper, Freud comes to a

striking definition of denial:
A new technical term is justified when it
describes a new fact or emphasizes it •...

The

oldest word in our psychoanalytical terminology,
"repression," already relates to this
pathological process.

If we wanted to

differentiate more sharply between the
vicissitude of the idea as distinct from the
affect, and reserve the word 'Verdrangung'
('repression') for the affect, then the correct
German word for the vicissitude of the idea would
be 'Verleugnung'

('disavowal') or denia1.26

The notion of disavowal has two different contexts.
The first is that which facilitates the developmental
process of the child.

Disavowal, in this context, is not

dangerous as it is in the schizophrenic.
26.

s.

In "Infantile

Freud, Standard Edition, V. XXI, p. 153.

19

Genital organization," Freud maintains, "Or, again, a
process may set in which I should like to call a
•disavowal,' a process which in the mental life of children
seems neither uncommon nor very dangerous but which in an
adult would mean the beginning of psychosis." 27
Freud explain this unharmful disavowal?

How does

In the same paper

he says,
we know how children react to their first
impressions of the absence of a penis.

They

disavow the fact and believe that they do see a
penis all the same.

They gloss over the

contradiction between observation and
preconception by telling themselves that the
penis is still small and will grow bigger
presently; and they then slowly come to the
emotionally significant conclusion that after all
the penis had at least been there before and been
taken away afterwards.

The lack of penis is

regarded as a result of a castration, and so now
the child is faced with the task of coming to
terms with castration in relation to himself.
The further developments are too well known
generally to make it necessary to recapitulate
them here." 28
27.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIX, p. 253.

28.

Ibid., pp. 243-244.
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From the above discussion we notice that Freud's way
of thinking is a paradoxical one.

This is to say that in

Freud's thought what is normal could be abnormal at a later
stage and vice-versa.

'This leaves us with a state of

puzzling ambiguities if\we want to follow the linear way of
thinking.

Paul Ricoeur in his book Freud and Philosophy

describes Freud's thought as the logic of the illogical.
we can also look at this kind of thought as the thought of
interrelatedness.

Donald Davidson in his celebrated

article "Paradoxes of Irrationality" also shows that the
agents of the psyche, the ego, the id and the superego are
"semi-independent" agents.

In other words, in regard to

Freud's way of thinking it is like someone who says yes and
no at the same time.

It is the logic of the dialectic

whose synthesis is an ongoing process.

But this should not

blind us if we have in mind Moliere's statement quoted by
Freud in his XVIII lecture "Fixation Upon Traumas:
Unconscious," "Il ya fagots et fagots."

The

This means,

according to Freud, that there is knowing and there is
knowing, and psychoanalysis is a way of knowing different
from other ways of knowing.
Ricoeur says.29

It is a new language as Paul

That said, let us consider the state of

sleep which is a normal aspect of our everyday life and see
how a psychotic action of the psyche could penetrate or
29.

Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans D. Savage
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1970), p.
3.
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take part in what is normal.
In his outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud identifies
dream action with "psychotic" actions.

"The Unconscious"

in which he formulates the relations between the conscious
and the unconscious is considered to be an illumination on
his theory of dreams.

Freud proposes that dreams are

compared with "pathological states akin to them."

Why?

The characteristics of dreams are like those of
schizophrenia; they are " ••• almost complete withdrawal from
the surrounding world and a cessation of interest in it.n30
since the ego is the agent formed by the stimulations
impinging from the external world, the ego detaches itself
from this external world and regresses to a state of
primitive narcissism; " •.. in the state of sleep, the [ego]
is carried to the point of restoring primitive
narcissism."31

Regression does not only effect the ego, it

also effects the libido.

In the state of sleep the libido

" ... goes back to the stage of hallucinatory satisfaction of
wishes.n32

This is to say that there is a "withdrawal of

cathexis from all ideas of objects from both the
preconscious and the unconscious portions of those
ideas.n33
30.

s.

31.

Ibid.

32.

Ibid., p. 223.

33.

Ibid., p. 224.

Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIV, p. 222.
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But, this is not to understand that there is a
complete withdrawal of cathexis.

The unconscious retains

some of its cathexis as well as the preconscious retains
some of its.

In other words, in dreams, "word-

presentations are taken back to the thing presentations
which belong to them. 1134

This movement must not mislead us

when it is said that dreams have schizophrenic actions.
What is common between dreams and schizophrenia is that
both show two major characteristics:

1) A withdrawal from

the external world, and 2) a hallucinatory quality.

How

hallucination comes into this Freud does not adequately
explain.

What is dissimilar between schizophrenia and

dreams is that in dreams there is a free association
between word-cathexes (Preconscious) and thing-cathexis
(Unconscious).
occur.

In schizophrenia this association does not

In this sense, in dreams there is a process by

which the psyche, to a large extent, detaches itself from
the external world in order to mirror or reflect upon
itself.

Both states, the waking state and the sleeping

state, are interrelated by a back and forth movement; one
withdraws from external reality in order to come back to it
in the waking state, i.e. external reality testing.
similar to the French proverb:

How

"Reculez pour mieux

sautez."
In this matter, reality testing is not fully explained
34.

Ibid., p. 228.
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It seems that Freud has a via neqativa
style.
-

He explains what is normal by what is pathological, "We can
already learn from pathology the way in which realitytesting may be done away with or put out of action. 11 35
Reality testing is put out of action because the ego has to
"disavow" what is found to be unbearable in the external·
reality.

Consequently, the ego breaks off its relation

with this reality.

But having in mind what was said

before, that detachment from external reality could be
extreme but rarely complete, the psyche tries to adjust
itself in a homeostatic way; in this case the "wish" is a
means to restore its lost homeostatic action.
wishful psychosis is a reaction to

11

•••

Then a

a loss which reality

affirms, but which the ego has to disavow. 11 36

This is to

say that a "wish" tries to regain what has been lost.
What does this mean in a non-pathological state?

What

it really means is that Freud did not only intend to
investigate the pathogenic side of the psyche.

What he

really intended to investigate is the normal development of
the human being.

His concern was with man in the world as

Franz Alexander implies in his book, The Western Mind in
Transition.3 7

A person who is able to "participate" in the

35.

Ibid., p. 233.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Franz Alexander, The Western Mind in Transition (New
York: Random House, 1960) .
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world, to integrate conflicts, to develop a readiness for
this world in which he or she lives.

Integration,

participation and readiness find their root or nucleus not
in the present, but in the past and extend their influence
to the present and the future.

These three notions as

implied by Freud are seen within the context of interrelatedness of the past, present and future.

Lack of

integration mostly resides in the past in a "precipitating
situation."

The inadequate early integration results in a

fragile defense mechanism.

In other words, there is a

"symbolic repetition" of the early undesirable events.

The

dependency of the child is an extremely important notion
which assumes the sociability of the human being.

Denial

of these external relationships destroys the possible
readiness for integration and participation.

In his

"Formulation on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,"
Freud comments on the importance of external reality,
We are now confronted with the task of
investigating the development of neurotics and of
mankind in general to reality, and in this way of
bringing the psychological significance of the
real external world into the structure of our
theories.38
The Notion of Denial or Disavowal
In this section two main approaches are going to be
38.

s. Freud, standard Edition,

v.

XII, p. 218.
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discussed.

The first is understanding denial as distinct

from repression.

The second approach is understanding .

denial as a matter of degree.

The reader must be cautioned

that an absolute clarity may not be achieved due to some
ambiguities in Freud's text.

Facing such a challenge, it

would be enough to acknowledge "the obscurities."
Freud's honest wish.

This is

Facing this challenge, let us try to

uncover what could be implicit in some of Freud's texts.
Let us start with denial as seen in relation to
repression which is according to Freud the primary factor
in the genesis of neurosis.

In his "Psycho-analytic Notes

on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia" and
in his "Formulation on the Two Principles of Mental
Functioning," denial or disavowal appears in a disguised
fashion.

In the latter, Freud says about neurosis that it

" ... has as its result and probably therefore as its
purpose, a forcing of the patient out of real life, an
alienating of him from reality. 11 39

In this context, the

defense mechanism used by Freud in regard to schizophrenia
as well as to neurosis is repression (Ablehnung) .

The word

"disavowal" is not used, but implied as detachment from
real life.

The dilemma remains in giving a technical word

other than repression to the mechanism by which doing away
with reality occurs.

In his Introductory Lectures, Freud

comes up with a temporary solution.
39.

Ibid.

He gives denial as an
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equal meaning to repression.

But he concludes with this

cautious statement, "so far as we know at present. 1140

This

means that he was prepared for further investigations.
Freud's interrogative investigations shows that he was
aware of a different process than repression.

For example,

in "Narcissism" his interrogation pointed to disavowal
without specifying it.

This is explicitly apparent in

finding the difference between 'repression' in
schizophrenia and 'repression' in neuroses.

At those

difficult intellectual times the notion of repression was
not clear enough as it appears in "Repression", due to his
difficulty in explaining the relationships between the
conscious and the unconscious.

Although in the

"Unconscious" he came to terms with these relationships,
the notion of repression remained an enigma.

The impasse

reached its peak in "A Metaphysical Supplement to the
Theory of Dreams," and without having a clear explanation,
he called the process of detachment from external reality
"disavowal."
In "Infantile Genital Organization" for the first time
Freud technically uses the word denial.

This in relation

to the reaction of the little boy to his discovery that
women don't have a penis.
reality affirms.

The little boy denies what

In other words, he refuses to recognize

the traumatic perception of the physiological reality of
40.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, V. XVI, p. 421.

27

the opposite sex.

It is a trauma that is normal for the

development of children although it shows a schizophrenic
reaction.

According to this discovery, Freud, at last,

solved his intellectual enigma.

As discussed and defined

before in this chapter, and as it is shown in "Fetishism,"
as well as in the Ego and the Id, neurosis is the conflict
between the ego and the id, psychosis is the conflict
between the ego and the external world.

Considering this,

repression repels demands emerging from the id and
disavowal wards off undesirable "idea" emerging from the
external world.
The First Approach to the Meaning of Denial
Giving the meaning of disavowal caused another
problematic issue for Freud.

The problem centered around

two words, denial (Verleugnung) and negation (Verneingung).
At the beginning he used both terms interchangeably as a
defense against the emergence of undesirable memories.

He

says, "the deeper we go the more difficult it becomes for
the emerging memories to be recognized, till near the
nucleus we come upon memories which the patient disavows
even in reproducing them."41
this.

We must not be puzzled with

Stored memories originally come from the external

world in the process of participation with this world as
well as in the process of introjection.

Later on,

Verneingung came to be negation rather than disavowal.
41.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. II, p. 289.
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Freud gives us a very penetrating example.

In analyzing

the dream of one of his patients, Freud says,
You ask who this person in the dream can be.
is not my mother!
his mother.'

We amend this to:

It

'so it is

In our interpretation we take the

liberty of disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject matter alone of the association. 42
undoubtedly, this does not seem to be perfectly clear.
least we know that there are some obscurities.
continue attempting to clarify.

At

Let us

R.S. Zwi Werplowski in his

"Denial and Religion" interprets both Verlungnung and
verneingung as a "double aspect of denial."

But this does

not clarify the difficulty of Freud's usage.

Let us have

another attempt to put the pieces together.
Now, we need to excuse ourselves for the repetitions
and the overlapping of the material discussed.

This would

put the ambiguities as well as the clarity into more
definite perspective.
meanings of disavowal.

Let us look at the two major
Firstly, in most general terms,

according to Freud, disavowal in a psychotic state of mind
refers to a reaction of the ego to an intolerable external
reality.

This is supplemented by "hallucinatory psychosis"

as a reaction to a loss which external reality affirms.
Let us call this disavowal A.
42.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition,

v.

XIX, p. 235.
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secondly, disavowal refers to the reaction of the
little boy to the absence of the male genital in a woman.
we know how children react to their first
impression of the absence of a penis.

They

disavow the fact and believe that they do see a
penis all the same.

They gloss over the contra-

diction between observation and preconception by
telling themselves that the penis is still small
and will grow bigger presently; and they then
come to the emotionally significant conclusion
that after all the penis had at least been there
before and been taken away afterwards.43
In "Fetishism," Freud maintains that denial is a defense
mechanism operative in the fetishist.

He describes it as

follows, "the fetish is a substitute for the penis ....

The

fetish is precisely disguised to preserve it from extinction.1144

We notice that this disavowal emerges in

different proportions in psychosis as well as in neurosis.
Let us call this disavowal B.
Thirdly, another meaning of disavowal emerges in
Freud's literature as distinct from the notion of
repression.

This includes the "disavowal of perceptions."

Let us return to the previous theme that the childish ego,
under the domination of the real world, gets rid of
43.

Ibid., p. 144.

44.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition,

v.

XXI, p. 152.

30
undesirable instinctual demands by a defense mechanism
called repressions.
we will now supplement this by further asserting
that, during the same period of life, the ego
often enough finds itself in the position of
fending off some demand from the external world
which it feels distressing and that this is
effected by means of a disavowal of the
perceptions which brings to knowledge this demand
from reality. 45
Let us call this disavowal

c.

Leo Goldberger explains this

kind of denial:
the ego may be said to have at its disposal a
screening apparatus which can reduce a percept to
a signal.

Should the original evoke pain or

anxiety beyond a certain threshold the percept
does not achieve conscious awareness--it is
denied or somehow blocked .... What specifically
is denied?

The total impact of the percept,

i.e., both the cognitive and its inseparable
intensity component, the affects.46
This blocking out or warding off the percepts is called by
45.

s.

46.

Leo Goldberger, "The Concept and Mechanisms of Denial:
A Selective Overview." From The Denial of Stress, ed.
by Shlomo Breznitz (New York: International University
Press, 1983), p. 85.

Freud, Standard Edition, V, XXIII, pp. 203-204.
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Edith Jacobson in her article "Denial and Repression" a
form of amnesia.

In a metaphorical sense she pictures it

as putting this memory or percept behind an "iron curtain."

so, what Freud calls repression as a reaction to ward off
reality or attempting at flight from reality is now called
by Freud disavowal, i.e., in our own language disavowal

c.

Let us have an example of this category of disavowal.
Freud gives us this,
Let us suppose, then, that a child's ego is under
the sway of a powerful instinctual demand which
it is accustomed to satisfy and that it is
suddenly frightened by an experience which
teaches it that the continuance of this
satisfaction will result in an almost intolerable
real danger.

It must now decide either to

recognize the real danger, give way to it and
renounce the instinctual satisfaction, or disavow
reality and make itself believe that there is no
reason for fear, so that it may be able to
maintain the satisfaction.47
So what can we learn from these three categories of
disavowal?

Disavowal A is an extreme kind of disavowal.

It is schizophrenia itself.

The schizophrenic does not

"displace" reality as in the case of the fetish: he or she
"replaces" reality by hallucination.
47.

The neurotic such as

s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XXIII, p. 275.
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the fetishist (disavowal B) has an "initial obedience" to
reality, at the same time an "initial flight" in a symbolic
waY•

Freud means that the neurotic ignores reality and the

psychotic disavows it.

In disavowal B the perceptual

relation to reality remains open while in psychosis the
perceptual relation to reality is "closed," and,
consequently, hallucination takes place as a means to match
with the new created reality and also as an attempt to
restore the lost reality.

Disavowal c is a stage necessary

for developmental process by which the child learns how to
live or to mediate between the external and the internal.
The second Approach to the Meaning of Disavowal
In the previous sections we showed how important the
theme of schizophrenia is to Freud.

It is important

because through his investigation of this extreme mental
sickness he was able to draw the line of demarcation
between the conscious and the unconscious, the relation
between ego and the object, the internal and the external
reality and the importance of the ego as synthesizer and as
an agent of participation between the internal and the
external world.
In this section we are going to face more ambiguities
especially when the notion of lesser psychosis is taken
into consideration.

The line of demarcation is blurred.

This should not be strange if we consider the zig-zag,
circular way of Freud's thinking.

We shall try to reach a
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sufficient conclusion.
schizophrenia as an

"id~e-limite"

could be considered

as a general description of regression to the auto-erotic
stage which is accompanied by hallucination as an attempt
to recapture what is lost.

The question is:

Is there a

psychotic state which could be considered as psychotic, but
not exactly schizophrenic?
paranoia.

The answer is yes.

It is

What are the major differences between

schizophrenia and paranoia?
three major differences:

There are, according to Freud,

Firstly, in paranoia unlike

schizophrenia, the relation with the external world is
retained.

Secondly, the mechanism by which paranoia

manifests itself is by projection on the external world.
In schizophrenia hallucination takes place.

Thirdly,

paranoia refers to a regression to the narcissistic stage;
schizophrenia refers to a regression to the auto-erotic
stage.

It seems that the paranoic regresses to a stage

which is the next on the scale of the human development.
Having in mind the differences between schizophrenia
and paranoia we are able to draw out the notion of
regression as common to both, but to a lesser degree in
paranoia.

Considering that the paranoic keeps his or her

relation to the external world as in neurosis, we come out
with this question:

Can we consider paranoia as a less

extreme psychosis or an extreme neurosis?
distinction Freud's text is not clear.

As to the

Let us try to dig
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for what could be implicit in Freud's text.
In order to get into the implicit level it is
worthwhile to refer to some of Freud's remarks already
mentioned in this chapter.

Freud maintains that our

absolute detachment from reality could not really happen.
Hallucination in schizophrenia is considered by Freud as an
"attempt" to regain what was lost.

What we learn from this

is that an "absolute" detachment from reality is only a
possibility.

Referring to his ego psychology it is obvious

that the ego does not reach the limit of an "absolute"
detachment from reality.

In other words, there is always a

part of the "ego" that remains aware, "the disavowal is
always supplemented by an acknowledgment. 11 48

In his

interpretation of Freud, Leo Goldberger puts it, "Denial is
not an all-or-none affair. 11 49
Another issue we would like to raise is the notion of
"leakage."
dreams.

In relation to this notion we have in mind

As mentioned before, dreams are "psychotic"

manifestations of the psyche.

It is a particular disavowal

of the external world taking into consideration that a part
of the ego does not "sleep."

Although dreams have

"psychotic" reactions, yet, they could not be considered as
a disease of equal pathology as schizophrenia.

They are

less schizophrenic or less psychotic considering that
48.

Ibid., p. 204.

49.

Goldberger, p. 87.
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a:t>solute psychosis "perhaps never" happens.

The point we

would like to make is that leakage happens in degrees.

Let

us see what Donald P. Spence says in "The Paradox of
oenial."
Denial is never complete.

It has a partial

effect; only when by allowing some threatening in
formation to register can it orient the person
where not to look.

This information is variously

elaborated and transformed, it can be mixed with
the subject's own fantasies, and can often
produce a supposed reality which is more
terrifying than the actual reality •.•.

It is

this very "leakage" which keeps the mechanism in
operation.

If all input were blocked--if denial

were complete--the mechanism would probably cease
operating.

What seems to happen is that a finely

adjusted feedback loop is created which
determines just how much negative information is
permitted to slip though.

If too much leakage is

allowed, the person becomes anxious and denial is
increased; with too little leakage, denial is
discontinued and the person is exposed to threats
which he cannot tolerate, at which point the
denial comes back into operation.50
50.

D. Spence, "The Paradox of Denial," from The Denial of
Stress, ed. by s. Breznitz (New York: International
University Press, 1983), p. 103.
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W}lat we can deduce from this is that the notion of the
nieakage" explains that the human psyche operates within
oscillating limits.

This is to say that there could be an

extreme psychosis, less extreme psychosis, extreme
neurosis, less extreme neurosis, a healthy person, less
healthy and less healthier, etc ••

Referring to the

function of the ego, the ego might have good control over
the other two agents, or less control, or a minimum
control, etc.

It seems that getting into the limits, it

would be hard to draw a sharp and clear distinction between
the degrees of denial.

An absolute manifestation of one

phenomenon of the psyche seems to be impossible or rare.
It is no wonder that Freud's psychology is the psychology
of "disruptive powers"; each agent protects itself against
its own forces as well as it protects itself against other
attached forces.

That said, the overlapping

characteristics between psychosis and neurosis are
overwhelming.

Consequently, ambiguity emerges, and this is

definitely articulated with Freud's thought, i.e., there is
always an unknown to be dealt with, there is always an
absent-presence to consider, there is a search for what has
been lost; and finally, there are beliefs to be adopted and
beliefs to be modified.

It is the dialectic itself and the

synthesis is an ongoing process.
poet says:

This confirms what the

"As long as he on earth shall live/ So long I

make no prohibition./

While man's desires and aspirations
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stir,/ He cannot choose but err" (Goethe's Faust, Part I,
SC· I) •

gonclusion
Freud describes psychoanalysis as "intellectual hell."
This is due to its emphasis on studying the inner
interrelated levels of the mind.

In this context, prior to

explicating the notion of denial, Freud had to define the
two fundamental notions of psychoanalysis:
and the unconscious.

the conscious

The latter is explained in relation

to schizophrenia which is a mental disease by which the
link between the "word presentation" and the "thing
presentation" is to a certain degree - extreme or less
extreme - disrupted or disconnected.

The ego, the reality

testing agent, loses much of its contact with the external
reality; a reality which Freud gives a crucial importance
to the development of the person as a being who
participates in the world.

Freud calls the defense

mechanism by which a person "wards off" external reality
"disavowal" or "denial".
But due to the complexities which underlie the notion
of denial, Freud's investigations led us to believe that
denial is never complete.

This is to say that denial of

the external reality is a matter of degree:

extreme as it

is the case with schiozophrenia (denial A), less extreme as
it is the case of the neurotic fetish (denial B), and the
denial of the young boy of the absence of the penis in the
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female which is considered by Freud as natural in the
development of the person in this particular stage (denial
C) •

This matter-of-degree in denying the external reality

_ as shown in denial A and denial B - is related to the
inability of the ego to mediate between the inner world and
the external world.

This shows that although the ego is

"feeble" it continues to assume its power.

In other words,

the ego is a major power in the process of homeostasis
which affirms the perspective that denial is always
accompanied by a certain degree of acknowledgement.
If denial is warding off external reality, then the
question that will be addressed is:
as vice?
chapter.

Can we consider denial

This question will be answered in the next

CHAPTER TWO

That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet
--Shakespeare
Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc II
Plus 9a change plus c'est la meme chose
--French proverb
Introduction
The major question to be answered in this chapter is:
could we consider denial as vice in Freud's literature?
The answer is yes.

But, this is not enough, for

clarification is needed about why denial could be
considered as vice.

To answer this question one finds that

some difficulties may block this investigation.

Why?

The

answer lies in Freud's attitude to ethics and morality.

As

Heinz Hartzmann expresses it, in his life-long
psychoanalytic investigations, morality was not that close
to Freud's heart.

"What is moral is self-evident"l as

Freud used to quote F.T. Visher.
But this should not be considered as a blocking wall
against the purpose of our investigation.

The attainment

of a growing knowledge about a certain writer is not

1.

Heinz Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (New
York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1960),
p. 14.
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restricted to our reading of his or her explicit side; but
bY reading what is between the lines.

Leo Strauss

expresses it as follows:
The only presentations of an author's views which
can be accepted as true are those ultimately
borne out by his own explicit statements.
[This] .•. principle is decisive; it seems to
exclude a priori from the sphere of human
knowledge such views of earlier writers as are
indicated exclusively between the lines.

For if

an author does not tire of asserting on every
page of his book that g is Q, but indicates
between the lines that g is not Q, the modern
historian will still demand explicit evidence
showing that the author believed g not Q.

Such

evidence cannot possibly be forthcoming, and the
modern historian wins his argument:

he can

dismiss any reading between the lines as
arbitrary guess work, or, if he is lazy, he will
accept it as intuitive knowledge. 2
In this regard, we pose another question:
investigate and support our argument?

how do we

What is really

needed is the understanding of Freud's psychoanalytic
language from its own perspective as it emerged in our

2.

Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing
(Glenceo, IL: Free Press, 1952), pp. 31-32.
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century as a language in its own right.
affirms this point of view.

Paul Ricoeur

He says,

It seems to me there is an area today where all
philosophical investigations cut across one
another -- the area of language ... in search of a
comprehensive philosophy of language to account
for the multiple functions of the human act of
signifying and for their interrelationships.

We

have at our disposal a symbolic logic, exegetical
science, anthropology.and psychoanalysis and
perhaps for the first time, we are able to
encompass in a single question the problem of the
unification of human discourse.3
This quotation shows another important notion which is the
interrelationships of the multiple functions of language as
they pave the way to the "unification of human discourse.''
So, discourse is what we aim at, discourse between the
language of Freud and Aristotle.

Considering the approach,

what is implicit in Freud's writing concerning denial could
come to the surface as we take Aristotle's definition of
vice as our starting point.

Why Aristotle?

book Virtues and Vices gives us the answer.

F. Foot in her
She says,

In spite of this recent work, it is best when
considering the virtues and vices go back to
3.

Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. D. Savage.
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1970), p.
3•
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Aristotle and Aquinas .•• It is certain ••. that the
most systematic account is found in Aristotle.4
This is also not easy to tackle.

Comparing a

psychanalytic notion to a philosophical notion would seem
to uncover undefinable ambiguities.

In order to conquer

these prospective ambiguities, let us try to find out what
were the common places upon which both Freud and Aristotle
depended upon.

Finding these common places will help our

investigation to bridge the gap.
Trying to bridge this gap, one must bear in mind that
Freud never meant to divorce himself from the intellectual
as well as the mythological principles of the "Greco-Roman"
traditions.

This is unquestionably apparent in having the

myth of Oedipus as the heart of his psychoanalytic
discoveries which he based on the scientific principles and
traditions of the western civilizations.

That said,

finding the common places between Aristotle and Freud will
help us in understanding the intentional implicit meaning
which underlies the difference between the language of
Freud's psychoanalysis and the language of Aristotle's
philosophy.
The Common Places
1) Man as a Social Being.

The proverbial statement by

Aristotle "Man is a social animal" is enough to state his
4.

Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and other Essays in
Moral Philosophy (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1978), p. 1.
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But this is not enough considering that

position.

Aristotle's ethics aims at the "good" which he defines as
115
. h every th'1ng aims.
.
"that at wh 1c

To attain the "good,"

Aristotle gives "political science ... the ruling science" as
the science which "uses the other sciences concerned with
action, and moreover legislates what must be done and what
avoided.

Hence its end will include the ends of the other

sciences, and so will be the human good. 11 6

In this

respect, the human good is not only the good of the
individual but also the good of the city.

This is to say,

"the good is the same for a city as for an individual,
still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more
complete good to acquire and preserve.

For while it is

satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even for an
individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and
preserve it for a people and for cities. 11 7

So what

Aristotle seems to say is that the good of the human being
is attained only in a city, i.e., in a society.

In other

words, there is no human being without a society; and being
superior to the individual, society dictates law, forms the
character of the individual and allows the integration of
its values and norms within the individual person.

In this

5.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin.
(Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985), Bk 1, 1,
1094a.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

I

Bk 1, 2, 1094b.
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sense there is, to a larger extent, an articulation between
the individual and his or her society.
society is no less important to Freud.

In the first

chapter, it was discussed how much Freud took pain to prove
the importance of the external world; a world which is
responsible for the differentiation of the ego as well as
to the formation of the superego.

This does not stop here.

According to Freud, the human experience is deeply rooted
in the unavoidable contact between the infant and his
parents, especially the mother, and later the individual's
desire to attain the "lost object."

In other words, the

essential task of civilization is to unite the individual
with society.

In his book, Civilization and its

Discontents, Freud says,
This task is one of uniting separate individuals
into a community bound together by libidinal
ties •.. the integration of separate individuals
into a human group, and in the other case the
creation of a unified group out of many
individuals. 11 8
Moreover, Freud in his essay "A Note upon the 'Mystic
Writing-Pad,'" in which he discusses a model by which the
psyche operates, shows how the ever "fresh" "receptive"
psyche is open to the stimulation from the external world
8.

s. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans.
James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961),
pp. 96-97.
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and

at the same time retains traces of the past

iDpressions.

These traces are preserved in the id which

activate themselves by disrupting the ego and by
threatening the social "oughts" incorporated by the
superego.

There is a circular movement from the outside to

the inside and then from the inside to the outside.
Furthermore, in the clinical setting the inherent social
dimension is also present.

One can unmistakably observe

that the client does not only reach the level of selfunderstanding, but also, he or she is understood by the
therapist, i.e., by another person.
The social dimension in the life of the person is
clearly evident in both Freud and Aristotle.

It is evident

in the sense that the person is a social being who
articulates, incorporates and develops only in a culture.
Whatever happens within the life of the individual, its
social dimension remains the source and the dynamic factor
in the formation of his or her character.
This similarity between Freud and Aristotle is clear.
But, as it appears in his Civilization and its Discontents,
Freud, unlike Aristotle, perceives society and culture as
the source of neurosis.

For Aristotle the "good of man" is

attained in the city state.

But Freud has a "tragic" sense

of life which originates in an attitude of "negation," as
Jacques Lacan explains it, resulting from the a "loss" of
the "bond with the mother."

In other words, it is a form
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of "castration" or a separation from what was "all" to the
infant.

Hence, later in life the individual fights a lost

battle in attaining this "lost object."

So, in contrast to

Aristotle, for Freud the attainment of the absolute "good"
is prohibited by society.

According to Lacan, the

attainment of the desired object remains within the
framework of desire.

He calls it "manque-a-etre. 119

Referring to what was already discussed, we can say
that Freud and Aristotle present us with the two sides of
the same coin.

Freud maintains that society is a necessary

unavoidable tragedy in which the good is desired, but never
attained.

Aristotle, on the other hand, maintains that

society is a necessity to achieve the good as well as to
achieve happiness.
Desire
As shown above, for Aristotle the "good" of the human
person is attained in the city through participation.
Considering the individual a participant in his or her
society implies that for Aristotle ethics is not something
over there.

It is incorporated within the person and

actualized in a form of "activity."

Also, to be a

participant in a culture, a person, to a large extent,
holds himself or herself back from wishing or desiring too
much.
9.

A desire should be deliberated on.

In Book III of

Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis, Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1973), p. 29.
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the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains how a person
gets to a final decision:
we have found, then, that what we decide to do is
whatever action among those up to us we
deliberate about and desire to do.

Hence also

decision will be deliberative desire to do an
action that is up to us; for when we have judged
(that it is right] as a result of deliberation,
our desire to do it expresses our wish.lo
What we notice in this quotation is that desire is
connected with deliberation which leads us to assume that
Aristotle does not imply any unconscious processes as Freud
does.

This is to say that upon deliberation one is

conscious of his or her desire.

Freud adds a new

dimension, i.e., the dimension of the unconscious which
embodies the id as "desiring," as Philip Rieff calls in his
book Freud:

The Mind of the Moralist.

Rieff describes this

desiring id as "indestructible" forces which knows "no
values, no good and evil, no morality"; a "primitive
chaos," "blind," "natural will" which "desires" what the
conscious mind is ignorant of.

In other words, the

unconscious id is the "larger sphere 11 ll which out of its
"fertility" the two other agents the ego and the superego
10.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, 3, 1113a.

11.

Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p.
35.
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emerge under the influence of the external world.

Freud

describes this unconscious instinctual id as a mob.

He

says,
woe, if they should be set loose!

The throne

would be overturned and the ruler trampled under
foot.

Society is aware of this -- and will not

allow the topic to be mentioned.12
Let us try to relate what is implied in both
perspectives.

For Aristotle we desire what is in

accordance with deliberation.

For Freud we desire more

than what is in accordance with the deliberation of the ego
and more than what culture allows.

But we must not forget

Aristotle's perspective that a human being is like any
other animal.

In De Anima he insists on the governing

powers of the human passions and desires; and in his
ethics, he also insists on the building of virtues in order
to organize our inner space and act with a sense of
"proportion" and coordination.

So in this context, Freud

and Aristotle speak a similar and an assimilable language.
As Aristotle advocates a sense of proportion in the
persons' life, so does Freud.

Freud advocates that this

"mob ..• eager for enjoyment and destruction has to be held

12.

Henry and Yela Lowenfeld, "Our Permissive Society and
the Superego: Some Current Thoughts About Freud's
Cultural Concepts." From The Psychology of
Adolescence, ed. Aaron Esman (New York: International
Universities Press, Inc., 1975), p. 497.
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down •.• by a prudent superior class." 1 3

Then, what else

other than prudence would come up with a sense of
•
I
proportion.

~a son

Aristotle, the child of his time, puts reason as that
faculty which distinguishes the human being from living
things.

In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, he clearly

states his position:
For living is apparently shared with plants, but
what we are looking for is the special function
of a human being; hence we should set aside the
life of nutrition and growth.

The life next in

order is some sort of life of sense-perception;
but this too is apparently shared, with horse, ox
and every animal.

The remaining possibility,

then, is some sort of life of action a.£ the part
that has reason.14
Again, in his qualification of those who study ethics,
Aristotle argues that a youth should not be a student of
"political science;" "since he tends to be guided by his
feelings, his study will be futile and useless; for its end
is action, not knowledge.n15

What Aristotle says is that

"political science," the science which builds the good
13.

Ibid.

14.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 1, 7, 1098a.

15.

Ibid., Bk 1, 4, 1095a.
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citizen, is a study guided by reason whose end is knowledge
put into action.

He continues, "If_, however, we are guided

bY reason in forming our desires and in acting, then this
knowledge will be of great benefit. 11 16
In the last chapter of his book, The Future of an
Illusion, Freud is no less an advocate of reason than
Aristotle.
says.

"I stand for the claims of reason ... , 11 17 he

For Freud, reason is not omnipotent.

weak, but persistent.

Reason is

Its voice is "a soft one ... but it

does not rest until it has gained a hearing.

Finally,

after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. 11 18
In this regard, Aristotle and Freud insist that building a
life according to reason is not an easy accomplishment.
This is to say, it is a struggle between the "irrational"
and the "rational."

Being a struggle, a virtuous life,

according to Aristotle, is not an easy thing to attain; it
has to be developed by practice.

In chapter 31 of his

A

History of Philosophy, F. Copleston, S.J., says, that in
the process of making a choice the "moral struggle" is
evident in Aristotle's writings on ethics.

This choice is

defined as "desireful reason" or "reasonable desire. 11 19
16.

Ibid.

17.

S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. J.
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), p. 51.

18.

Ibid.

19.

Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New
York: Image Books, 1962), Vol. I, Part II, p. 81.
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.Although Freud and Aristotle are considered to be
rationalists in their approach, yet one must be cautious in
attributing to them the qualifications attributed to some
other rationalists as shown in Tom Stoppard's play The
~umpers,

i.e., rigid self control and rigid obedience to

rules which do not allow the "articulation" between the
rational and the irrational.
"common sense" people.

Freud and Aristotle are

But what is common sense?

J.H.

Randall and J. Buchler define common sense in its nontechnical usage as "good sense," "native shrewdness," and
"a certain sense of practicality or rudimentary
intelligence."

In its philosophical sense they define it

as "sense that is common."
Its source is experience of the most fundamental
and pervasive character, the minimal biological,
social, and psychological experience of man.

All

that is necessary for its acquisition is the
exercise of the sense and the memory, and the
simplest kind of reasoning.

Common sense

knowledge is acquired by us willy-nilly, and not
in virtue of any method.

It results not from

infusing but from mere living ....

Thus common

sense is the starting-point of all inquiry.
may, by the employment of deliberate methods,
rise above it, but we can never dispense with

We
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rroro

20

this quotation we can infer four important notions:

character, experience, reasoning and living.

If we combine

all of these four notions together we find that what
underlies them is the act of living.
and Aristotle try to convey to us?

Isn't this what Freud
How?

Let us start with

Aristotle.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle never meant by
possessing the virtues a kind of abstract way of thinking,
but experiencing what is good for the human being in
"activity."

He says that it is much better to be brave

then to know about bravery.

In other word, the main

purpose of ethics is the developing of human character in
"concrete action," like "acting well."

How to act well?

Aristotle does not give us general rules.

To act well

depends on our upbringing, on our virtues and on the models
we set for ourselves.
example.

Aristotle gives Pericles as an

To act well entails experience; experience that

may change our lives in an act of "conversion."
does one know that it is the right experience?
is, as Michael Novak puts it, by "discernment."

But how
The answer
He

interprets Aristotle by saying that discernment cannot be
taught, it stems from the person's experience:

It is an

experience which is developed as the poet develops his
20.

J. H. Randall & J. Buchler, Philosophy: An
Introduction (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1971),
pp. 46-4 7.
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poetry and the artist develops his art and "that we make of
our lives an 'art of action .•• , 11 21 i.e. acting well at the
right time and in the right place.

Therefore, according to

Aristotle, the practice of rational decisions in our
everyday life is akin to art.
How is this implied in Freud's literature?

In The Ego

and the Id, Freud described the ego -- the rational agent
of the psyche, as a shrewd diplomat.

It represents reason

and common-sense.
The ego uses borrowed forces ... so, in the same
way the ego is in the habit of transforming the
id's will into action as if it were its
own22 •.• in the matter of action the ego's
position is like that of a constitutional
monarch, without whose sanction no law can be
passed but who hesitates long before imposing his
veto on any measure put forward by parliament ....
All the experiences of life that originate from
without enrich the ego; the id, however, is its
second external world, which it strives to bring
into subjection to itself.

It withdraws libido

from the id and transforms the object

cathexes

21.

Michael Novak, from a class lecture.
Post-Doctoral
Carnegie Institute in Philosophy of Religion, Notre
Dame University, 27 June, 1969.

22.

S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere (New
York: The Norton Library: W.W. Norton & Co., 1960), p.
15.
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of the id into ego structures ••• [the ego] is not
only a helper to the id; it is also a submissive
slave who courts his master's love •.. tried to
remain on good terms with the id; it clothes the
id's unconscious commands with the Pcs
[Preconscious] rationalization, it pretends that
the id is showing obedience to the admonitions of
reality, even when in fact it is remaining
obstinate and unyielding; it disguises the id's
conflicts with reality and, if possible, its
conflicts with the superego, too.23

In its

position midway between the id and reality, it
only too often yields to the temptation to become
sycophantic, opportunist and lying, like a
politician who sees the truth but wants to keep
his place in popular favor.24
It does not take much to observe that underlying the
functioning of the ego there is discernment and evaluation
of a certain impinging situation.

The ego weighs

situations and decides which is the best way to keep an
unbroken relationship with the external world.
lies -- a "noble lie"

If the ego

it is only because of the

necessity for adaptation rather than only the necessity for
integration.

In other word, the ego, sometimes falls sick,

23.

Ibid., p. 46.

24.

Ibid.
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deceives itself and deceives the other two agents only,
paradoxically speaking, to preserve itself.
11 5

It is a way of

avoir vivre" or the possession of the "art of living."

In this respect, there are two important similarities
between Freud and Aristotle.

1) Both do not give us rules

on what to do or what not to do.

They provide us with an

"operative structure" which we try to use the best we can.
2)

The matter of choice is an art revealed in a certain

style, tact and manners.

As the ego falls sick in order to

preserve itself, so it is with some ethical choices in
Aristotle's ethics.

He says that it would be, sometimes,

better to err on the deficient side rather than to err on
the excessive side.

For both, a person is capable of

prudent and adaptive mistakes.

Freud calls this the "self

confidence of health."
For more clarification, let us see how discernment and
this kind of diplomacy reveal themselves in a clinical
situation.

Freud, according to Joseph Rychlack, was never

only concerned with insightful intellectualization.

What

Freud is really concerned with is the fusion of insight
with activity.

So the insight he has on the activities of

ego in relation to the id and the superego, manifests
itself in the therapeutic situation.

How?

Firstly,

insight is joined after interpretation and after the
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"reenactment 11 2 5 of the past repressed experiences, e.g.,
the act of transference.

Secondly, in order to outdo the

past repressed fixation, oftentimes, the psychoanalyst,
according to P. Rieff, acts as the ego of the client, while
the client becomes an id coming to consciousness.26
Thirdly, as Freud describes the diplomatic function of the
ego, the analyst, oftentimes, allies with the id of the
client in order to bring it to consciousness.

In one of

his letters to Fliess, Freud metaphorically says that he
acts as "the devil" in order to get out the demons hidden
in the patient's breast.

In other words, he directs the

demons out to consciousness.

In other instances the

analyst becomes the superego of the client, i.e., the
prototype of the father.

When and how the analyst take

these acts depends on his or her power of discernment.

In

this regard, reason is a, discerning faculty and a
synthesizer of thoughts, actions and desires.
The very nature of reason is a guarantee that it
would not fail to concede to human emotions and
to all that is determined by the accurate
position to which they are entitled.27
25.

Joseph F. Rychlack, Introduction to Personality and
Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1981) I P• 95.

26.

Philip Rieff, The Mind of the Moralist (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 35.

27.

Heinz Hartman, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, p.

so.
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character
Freud describes character as what is " ••. based on the

memory-traces of our impressions; and, moreover, the
impressions which have had the greatest effect on us
those of our earliest youth -- are precisely the ones which
scarcely ever become conscious.n2S

Regardless of how or

why a certain character is formed, both Aristotle in his
Ethics and Freud in his typology, give a crucial concern to
character.

For both of them, there is an ethical component

which contributes to the formation of character; namely,
the internal as well as the external social world.

Being

locked in this internal-external struggle, the person, in
order to possess an adaptable and an integrative character
must exercise self-control and learn through experience the
act of discernment.

Without these two qualities the person

falls, according to Aristotle, into excessive or deficient
personality traits, and according to Freud, a person is
bound to be controlled by a personality type unconsciously
regulated by a regressive and fixative behavior brought
about by an unsatisfied early level of human development.
In spite of the differences in language, both Freud and
Aristotle give us certain character traits to which each
one gives different names.

In his book On Moral Character,

Jody Palmour provides us with a table showing us how
28.

s. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James
Strachey (New York: Basic Books, Inc./The Hograth
Press, Ltd., 1965), p. 578.
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different names are given to the same character traits:29
Aristotle
Generous
Miserly
Practical
Extravagant

Freud
Genital
Anal
oral-Aggressive
oral-Receptive

we will elaborate on these in due course.

It is worth

noting that due to the "dialectic approach" to the study of
the human mind, neither Freud nor Aristotle, ever isolates
one character trait from another.

They both believe in the

coexistence of different character traits.

Psychologically

speaking, two positive and negative contents could coexist.
Those who have some fixation on their anal stage which
includes "fecal interest" may develop two opposite
coexisting characteristics:

stinginess and cleanliness.

For Aristotle, a clever person could be courageous (a
positive characteristic) as well as stingy or exploitative
(a negative characteristic).
But, in spite of this coexistence of negative and
positive characteristics, one is capable of altering one's
life into a more favorable way; for Aristotle by building
the virtues, and for Freud, by insight and by undoing the
"libidinal fixation" on early stages of the person's
childhood.

According to P. Rieff, Freud's therapeutic aim

is to build two important virtues:

29.

the virtue of prudence

Jody Palmour, On Moral Character, (Washington, D.C.:
The Archon Institute for Leadership Development,
1986)' p. 158.
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the virtue of compromise. 30 Since it is a continuous
and
struggle, every highly competent and virtuous person may
have some doubts and fears.

What is really crucial is that

a competent and virtuous person is able to "suppress" or
"control" these doubts whenever it is discerned as
necessary, thanks to their "normal" struggle.

so; a

character, as Jody Palmour defines, refers to
The particular form of development of a person's
moral and emotional powers which dispose him to
excessive, deficient or appropriate responses;
developed through the interaction between one's
consitutional capacities or gifts and
environment, opportunities and pressures; while
relatively fixed and marked as an adaptation and
strategy toward life, one's character can become
either more or less virtuous.31
The last part of this quotation leads us to the next common
place.
As-a-Matter-of-Degree
In the first chapter we referred to the idea that
extreme schizophrenia as a psychosis is an "idee-limite."
This led us to the opinion that in Freud's literature the
line of demarcation between a schizophrenic denial and a
neurotic denial (the fetish)
30.

Rieff, p. 61.

31.

Ibid. p. 339.

is only a matter of degree.
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The former has an extreme denial of the external world, the
1atter has a less extreme denial of the external world.
This is also applicable as shown before, to other cases of
psychosis and neurosis.

Now let us see how as-a-matter-of-

degree is shown in Aristotle's ethics.
Let us prove our point by considering what Aristotle
says about a brave person.

The test of a brave person is

in a "life-threatening" situation.

In the Nicomachean

Ethics we notice that Aristotle uses the superlative in
order to prove that a certain act is the bravest.

This

means that this act is considered to include more courage
than another act.
Then what sorts of frightening conditions concern
the brave person?

Surely the most frightening;

for no one stands firmer against terrifying
conditions.

Now death is most frightening of

all, since it is a boundary, and when someone is
dead nothing beyond it seems either good or bad
for him any more.

Still not even death in all

conditions, e.g., on the sea or in sickness,
seems to be the brave person's concern.

In what

conditions, then, is death his concern?

Surely

in the finest condition.

Now such deaths are

those in war, since they occur in the greatest
and finest danger; .•• Hence someone is called
brave to the fullest extent if he is intrepid in
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facing a fine death and the immediate dangers
that bring death -- and this above all true of
the dangers of war.32
prom this quotation we can assume that a person who dies on
the battlefield for the sake of the city state is the
bravest.

This also means that facing death in the

battlefield is braver than facing death when a person is
diseased.

Why?

It is because on the battlefield a person

"shows greater prowess against that which threatens him. 11 33
Again, we notice the superlative and the comparative tense
which means that as-a-matter-of-degree is another element
in Freud's as well as in Aristotle's literature.
These common places prove that Freud's literature is
assimilable into Aristotle's literature.

These will help

our investigation by uncovering the implicit side of
Freud's notion of denial as vice.

But before coming to a

conclusion, we need to define vice as it is shown in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

So, the question is:

What

is vice according to Aristotle?
Aristotle identifies vice with that which "ruins."
ruins because it is an "activity" exercised in either
"excessive" or in a "deficient" practice:

"For both

excessive and deficient exercises ruin strength; and
likewise, too much or too little eating or drinking ruins
32.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, 7, 1116a.

33.

Jody Palmour, On Moral Character, p. 98.
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1134 It is contrary to virtue which 11 ••. like
health •••
nature, is better and more exact than any craft, it will
also aim at what is intermediate. 11 35 i.e. the "mean."

But

one should not be misled by the word "excess" or "extreme. 11
for virtue, according to Aristotle, is an extreme.

In

other words, virtue is an "excellence," i.e., an extreme.
Nicolai Hartmann provides us with this explanatory
diagram. 36

Goodness

Deficiency

Badness

Excess

F. Copleston S.J., explains this diagram.

He says,

The diagram illustrates the important point that
virtue ... has a double position. (i) As regards
the ontological dimension, it is an excellence or
extreme.

It is not as through virtue were a

composition of vices from a valuational point of
view, since, from this point of view, it stands
in opposition to both vices, but it is
nevertheless a mean from the ontological
viewpoint, since it combines in itself both the
34.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 2, 3, 1104a.

35.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 2, 6, 1106b.

36.

F. Copleston, A History of Philosoghy, citing Nicolai
Hartmann, p. 79.
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good points which, run to excess, constitute
vices.

For example, courage is not boldness

alone, nor is it cool foresight alone, but a
synthesis of both -- this character of a
synthesis preventing courage from degenerating
into the daring of the foolhardy man on the one
hand or the prudence of the coward on the other
hand. 37
How similar this act of synthesis is to Freud's function of
the ego as a synthesizer that was discussed earlier in this
chapter.

Considering this diagram we can say that vice is

an excess or a deficiency on the "ontological" level.
Considering the "ontological" basis, the question to be
addressed is:

how are the excess and the deficiency

evident in Freud's account of what "ruins" the
psychological harmony of the person?

Let us start with the

excesses and deficiencies of the functions of the three
agents of the human psyche.
Before getting into the excesses and deficiencies, one
must bear in mind that in addition to its ever fresh
receptivity, the psyche is ambivalent.
in Freud's opinion?

How is this evident

In the Ego and the Id, Freud shows how

fluctuating are the instincts: he says,

11

•••

That the

satisfaction of one instinct can take the place of the

37.

Ibid.
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satisfaction of another •••• " 38
the three agents of the psyche.
has its oughts and intentions.

This is also applicable to
In other words, each agent
As David Sachs explains

this, "···between any person's emotions ..• and the causes
thereof, there always obtain an actual proportionality or
real appropriateness, no matter how incongruous those
relations may appear to be."3 9
this?

What do we understand from

We understand that the agents of the psyche disrupt

each other.

It is an interplay between "urging and

checking forces" as Freud describes it.
alluding to this perspective?

Why are we

The reason is that due to

the interrelatedness of the three agents of the psyche, one
is unable to discuss one without discussing the other.
More precisely, discussing the excess functioning of one
agent explains the deficiency imposed on the other.

This

could be understandable if we have in mind how the process
of "negation" and "repression" operate, a topic not to be
discussed in this chapter.

Our aim is to prove that excess

or deficiency in the functioning of one of the three agents
is destructive and brings "ruin" to the harmony of the
psyche, by giving way for the two others to press the
expression of their need, i.e., the "return of the
38.

S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 34.

39.

David Sachs, "On Freud's Doctrine of Emotions.'' From
Philosophical Essays on Freud. ed. by Richard Wollheim
and James Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), p. 93.
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II

Now let us start with the super-ego and see how its
excess or deficient functioning explains the excess or
deficient functioning of the other two agents.
ego has two major parts:

The super-

Conscience and the ego-ideal.

The former is described as follows:
[the conscience] aggressiveness is introjected,
internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to
where it came from -- that is, it is directed towards
his own ego.

There it is taken over by a portion of

the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of
the ego as super-ego and which now, in the form of
'conscience' is ready to put into action against the
ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would
have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous
individuals.40
One cannot avoid noticing the paradoxical thinking in
Freud's literature.

Conscience is seen by Freud as an

object-cathexis which has been replaced by an
identification.

It is the agency which "has a great share

in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes
an essential contribution towards building up what is
called its 'character.

111

41

It is the agency which

" ... gathers up from the influences of the environment the
40.

S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 78.

41.

S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 18.
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demands which that environment makes upon the ego .•.• 11 42
In other words, it is the "goal of ethics."

A. Esman looks

at it as a useful concept in " .•• categorizing the
internalized model aspiration, goals and 'positive'
values. 11 43

From these similar points of view we gather

that the ego-ideal is both an agent in contact with the
environment in order to sustain already internalized values
and goals which are central to the formation of an ideal
image.

That said, the ego-ideal incorporates the virtues

and values of a culture which become the corner stone for
the person's actions, virtues and values which manifest
themselves in a "constant habit" whose contents are
"order," "moderation" and "constancy."
quality is "perseverance."

Their dynamic

This is to say that virtue,

i.e., values in action, is a conformity to an ideal
standard accompanied by a capacity to act in a responsible
way.
So the super-ego has three important functions:
First, a censor or a negator responsible for suppressing
the aggressive destructive instinctual drives; Second, the
carrier of moral virtues; third, a help in observing the
person's responsibility towards oneself and towards
society.
42.

Ibid.

43.

Aaron Esman, "Consolidation of the Ego Ideal in
Contemporary Adolescence," from The Psychology of
Adolescence. Ed. by A. Esman, p. 211.
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considering these three functions of the superego, one
must carry in mind that these functions should be
manifested with moderation.

An excess of these

manifestations results in an inadequate suppression or
repression of the instinctual demands.

In his paper, "On

the Theory of Hysterical Attack," Freud says,
[the three functions of the superego] are all of
them impressions that have failed to find an
adequate discharge, either because the patient
refuses to deal with them for fear of distressing
mental conflicts or because (as in the case of
sexual impressions) he is forbidden to do so by
modesty or by social circumstances.44
A crucial point should be observed in this quotation:
"fear of distressing mental conflicts."
lead us to say?

What does this

Reading between the lines we can assume

that, firstly, the hysteric patient faces an ethical
dilemma, i.e., it is right not to do it, or, it is wrong if
I do it.

Secondly, to be possessed by an excess of fear

means that the patient lacks courage to do the right thing
in the right time; or, we can say that the patient lacks
the art of discernment to act in a proportionate way.
Thirdly, the patient, to an extreme sense, is controlled by
a tyrannous superego.

44.

Fourthly, the patient is locked

Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, ed. J. Strachey (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), Volume 5, p. 30.
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petween two extreme oughts:
oughts of the superego.

the oughts of the id and the

Two "contrary wish fulfillments"

which find their expression in a "single expression" i.e.,
the hysteric attack.
More precisely, the virtue of "compromise" or the
virtue of "prudence" is lacking in the hysteric patient.
As implicitly implied, the virtue of "compromise" is an aid
by which the person compromises between two extremes.

Let's give an example:

love and hate.

Freud shows a

suspicious attitude toward "altruistic love."

He

maintains, "A love that does not discriminate seems to me
to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice
to its objects; and secondly, not all men are worthy of
love. 11 45

In this sense, an altruistic love hides "hate"

which has an undeniable existence in the human psyche.

so

the virtue of "compromise" is strengthened by the virtue of
prudence.

This is to say a person knows well not to cast

his or her pearls to swine.

Oftentimes, in Freud's

psychology the compromise arises in mechanisms such as
sublimation, identification, etc., mechanisms by which
human impulse have an adequate chance of discharge.
What has already been discussed shows that extreme
repression by the superego of the instinctual desires leads
to a pathological physical or psychological discharge of
these inhibited impulses which ruins the person's relation
45.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXI, p. 102.
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with himself or herself and with society.
question to be addressed is:

Now, the

What happens when an extreme

pennission is given to these instinctual impulses?
previously it was mentioned that Freud calls these impulses
11mobs" whose aim is destruction of both the individual and
"civilization."

Let us take our present days as a good

example of this phenomenon.

H. and Y. Lowenfeld say that

the observable "change in society's attitude towards sex
has made the conspicuous symptoms disappear ... and replaced
by a multitude of character neurosis and psychosomatic
manifestations. 11 46

This change in society's attitude has

bent itself towards permissiveness assuming that the
liberation of instincts is equivalent to freedom.

This

permissiveness neglects the proper maintenance of harmony
among the different agents of the human personality, and,
consequently, the individual loses his or her equilibrium
and also loses a realistic contact with the external world.
Another example of how society neglects the
psychological states of the individual is the concentration
on materialism which eventually leads to material wealth.
Freud warns us that the survival of a society does not
depend on the accumulation of wealth.

He says,

It has become clear that civilization cannot
consist principally ... in wealth itself and the
46.

H. & Y. Lowenfeld, "Our Permissive Society and the
Superego: Some Current Thoughts about Freud's Cultural
Concepts," from The Psychology of Adolescence, p. 496.
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means of acquiring .•. for these things are
threatened by the rebelliousness and destructive
mania of the participants in civilization.47
Freud implicitly means what Aristotle calls "greed."

So,

the liberation of instincts as well as the emphasis on
materialism reflects the idea on how a permissive society
gives an ultimate authority to one and only one factor as
the sole reason for directing the individual's life.

That

said, we assume that such kinds of attitudes are the result
of overlooking two important factors:

Firstly, the harmony

and the unity of the person, and, secondly, the moderation
which is a crucial aspect of building up the character of
the person.

Consequently, the "pleasure principle"

dominates one's life and the "feeble" but "persistent" ego
is unable to process the introjection and the repression
mechanisms through which the ego takes them upon itself to
"erect" them again as an "obstacle within itself."

The

introjection and the repression mechanisms are weakened and
the "reality principle" is given up to the "pleasure
principle."

This kind of character is called by Aristotle

a "self-indulgent" character.
Moreover, in such kinds of society the role of the
father is reduced and the process of identification and
internalization is reduced, too.

The lasting effects of

the first identification with the parents which takes place
47.

s.

Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 10.
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"earlier than any object cathexis" is blocked and the
result is a great disappointment.

This is due to the

discrepancy between the infantile and the later image of
the father.

H. and Y. Lowenfeld maintain,

The contemporary father acts much more like a
weak older brother.

We have always seen that the

milder father does not lead to a milder
superego .•. but rather to an increase of fantasies
and projections.

For the development of the

superego the projections are decisive; power and
cruelty of the parents are magnified by the
fantasies. 11 4 8
Eventually, the ego fails to do the work of reality
testing.

This disappointment with the later image of the

father is replaced by a disappointment in society,
traditions, and history.

The cultural ideal which,

according to Freud, provides the individual with a
"narcissistic" attitude is replaced by distrust and selfcenteredness.

Aristotle calls this kind of character the

"hoarding" character.

In this context, the word

"narcissism" used by Freud implies a moderate narcissism of
similar meaning to pride; e.g., the teacher says to his or
her student "I am proud of you."

It is a "mean" between

infantile narcissism and pathological narcissism.
48.

H. & Y. Lowenfeld, "Our Permissive Society and the
Superego: Some Current Thoughts About Freud's Cultural
Concepts." From The Psychology of Adolescence, p. 500.
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Narcissism in this sense is related to the ego-ideal.
aaving an ego-ideal or a model helps the individual to
accept something "unpleasant" for the sake of an ideal.

It

also helps in the suppression of the instinctual drives.
Freud explains this as follows:
The satisfaction which the ideal offers to the
participants in the culture is thus of a
narcissistic nature; it rests on their pride in
what has already been successfully achieved ....
The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the
cultural ideal is also among the forces which are
successful in combating the hostility to culture
within cultural unit.

This satisfaction can be

shared in not only by the favored classes .•• but
also by the suppressed ones, since the right to
despise the people outside it compensates them
for the wrongs they suffer within their own
unit.49
From the above discussion we come to know that selfindulgence is the result of the freedom given to the
"sexual" instincts.

This leads to the weakening of the ego

control and the ego adaptive alliances with the two other
agents.

As a result, the ego-ideal exemplified by the

father is weakened and given up to an aggressive and
distrustful fantasies, but one might argue that, at least,
49.

S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 13.
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the sexual urges are satisfied.

Clinical psychoanalytic

research has shown contrary result.

Freud explains this.

ge says,
If sexual freedom is unrestricted from the outset
the result is not better.

It can easily be shown

that the psychical value of erotic needs is
reduced as soon as their satisfaction becomes
easy.

An obstacle is required in order to

heighten the libido.n50
The notion of obstacle, in this sense, is very important.
It is the function of the ego which allows a well timed,
necessary alliance with one of the other agents of the
psyche; it is an alliance in order to exercise self
control.

The self-controlled man as appears in Aristotle's

ethics is a virtuous man.
What else results from the reduction of the
"obstacle?"

The reduction in the power of the "obstacle"

over the aggressive drives creates in the individual a
sense of self-absorption in his or her own desires and
needs.

This results in the loss of interest in

relationships, and contributes to the projection of
fantasies on the external reality.
testing is impaired.

Consequently, reality

It also adds an " ... amazing lack of

fear," i.e., a "foolhardy" character.
important features:
50.

This leads to two

"aggression" and the desire for an

S. Freud, Standard Edition,

v.

II, p. 187.
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easY life."

This means that the individual possesses the

vices of laziness, lack of self-control and foolhardiness.
In addition to the weakening of the ego by the
tyrannous onslaughts of the id and superego, the ego has
its excessive functioning.

In our everyday language we

describe a person by saying that he has a "big ego" or he
is going on an "ego trip"

Using these description we imply

that this person is arrogant, stubborn, etc.

These

qualifications attributed to a person whether in the
religious traditions or the Aristotelean traditions are
called vices.

In Freud's words this ego loses having

"flexibility" and "craft."

Edith Jacobson in her article

"Denial and Repression" presents us with a case of a man
who, repressing and denying his childhood traumatic
experiences with his mother, reached a point of denying the
existence of both the _id and the superego.

This is to say

that this man's ego wards off the existence of what is
external to itself and becomes like a king without
subjects.51
Typology
In the course of this chapter we have seen that both
Freud and Aristotle show interest in character, character
which distinguishes in thought and action one person from
another.
51.

The difference between Freud and Aristotle is

Edith Jacobson, "Denial and Repression," Journal of
American Psychoanalytic Association, October, 1957,
Vol. 5, pp. 64-69.
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that Aristotle qualified the person's character between
virtuous and vicious.

Freud was satisfied in describing

the psychodynamic of the human psyche.

But, as Freud

always said that morality is self-evident; and since, as H.
Hartmann says that Freud never meant to break off from the
principles of the Greco-Roman nor from the principles of
the Judeo-Christian traditions, then, we can take Freud up
on his position that some human characters are vicious.
Let us start with his typology and try to see how close he
is to Aristotle.

Since our concern is vice, we are going

to concentrate on the "vicious" character and overlook the
virtuous ones.
I)

The Oral Personality.

A person who fixates on the

oral stage tends to be, to a large extent, passive and
receptive, subservient, a follower, trusting, optimistic,
and accepting.

He or she also tends to be a heavy eater

and enjoys activities related to the mouth.

But, since, as

discussed before, opposite characters do coexist in the
same person, as they stem from the same "sexual instinct,"
an oral character might be hostile.

In book 4, Chapter 5

of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle equates hostility with
"excessive anger," a quality of character which includes
these characteristics:
1.

Those who get angry at the wrong people, at the
"wrong time."

2.

Those who get angry quickly -- irascible people.
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3.

Those who are "quick tempered to extreme."

4.

Those who are hard to reconcile -- bitter people.

5.

Those who are irritable by "the wrong things."

II)

Anal Personality.

following characteristics:
obstinate.

The anal character exposes the
Orderly, hoarding, and

Character traits such as hoarding, miserly or

obstinate originated in an early conflict with parents over
when to "go potty. 11 52

It also stems from lack of parental

appreciation to "fecal matter" which is "the first gift
that the child has for the parent. 11 53

As a result, the

child likes to keep it for himself, and consequently, the
child develops the tendency to be a taker than a giver.
In Aristotle's ethics, hoarding is the vice of
"deficient giving."

He calls it ungenerosity.

It comes more naturally to human beings than
wastefulness; for the many are money-lovers
rather than givers ...

For it consists in two

conditions, deficiency in giving and excess in
taking. 54
III)

Urethral Personality.

This character trait is

the result of humiliation of enuresis.

The child develops

a "burning ambition to succeed in life. 11 55

He or she aims

52.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. IX, p. 169.

53.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XVII, p. 81.

54.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 4, 1, 112lb.

55.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition,

Vol. IX, p. 175.
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onlY for his or her success and develops an inhibited
"envious" attitude.

Considering humiliation as its root,

competitiveness hides a sense of inferiority which acts as
a catalyst for wishing an easy success.

Disappointed by

the difficult struggle, this person tends to be easily
bored and consequently ends up being unsuccessful.

Being

ambitious, yet, unsuccessful, he or she tends to be
selfish, crude and exploitative.

His or her sexuality is

energized by competing to obtain other wives or husbands in
particular in

fantasie~.

Let us take what Aristotle says about envy in his
Rhetoric.
Those who in any respect are ambitious of glory
are given to envy in that respect ..•.

(Envy is]

a sort of pain at apparent good fortune ....

Men

also envy those with whom they are at rivalry •••.
And as men are affected by ambition in regard to
rivals, and competitors, and all •.. who are eager
after the same objects, it must follow that they
envy these in a special manner ....

And those who

either succeed with difficulty, or do not succeed
at all, envy those who succeed quickly.n56
In other words, an envious person is selfish.
IV)
56.

The Phallic Personality.

This type of

Aristotle, Treatise on Rhetoric, trans. Theodore
Buckley (London: George Bell and Sons., 1903), bk 2,
10, (3-4)' pp. 145-146.
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personality trait shows a "sexualized pattern."

It results

from an unsatisfactory resolution of the Oedipal stage.
The person shows the following inclinations:

1) Self-

centered, 2) egotistical, 3) lustful with a vengeance
attitude, 4) revolutionary "[males] not accepting the
paternal superego. 11 57

5) "Masculinity complex 1158 among

females.
From this description of the phallic personality we
are able to observe that the person lacks "temperance" and
possesses "self-indulgence," i.e., an intemperate person.
In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle maintains that
temperance " ..• is a mean concerned with pleasures ... for it
is concerned less, and in a different way, with pains.
Intemperance appears in this same area too •... 59
these things,
is bestial •...

To enjoy

[body pleasures] and to like them most of all
The touching that is proper to the

intemperate person concerns only some parts of the body,
not all of it. 11 60
V)

The Genital Personality.

The genital person,

according to Freud, is the healthiest among all the other
types.

Yet, we need to caution ourselves that Freud

clearly states that the line of demarcation between health
57.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XIX, pp. 91-92.

58.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXII, pp. 129-130.

59.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, 10, 1117b.

60.

Ibid., 1118b.
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and sickness is ambiguous.

This is to say that the

boundaries oscillate and overlap.

If the genital. person is

the healthiest, then, let us consider this personality
~

trait as an "idee-limite."
healthiest.

We need to ask why it is the

The answer is simple.

At the age of six the

child has already formed a "person prototype," i.e., the
parents as an "image" to identify with.

J. Rychlak

explains this phrase as follows:
Since the personality structure is finalized by
the onset of latency .•• Freud had no need to
frame a latency or adolescent personality
type ••••

All this means •.. is that the person is

finally capable of reproduction and presumably
can find in sexual relations the satisfactions
that he or she had obtained earlier from the
pregenital erogenous zones. 11 61
But how many pass the pregenital erogenous zones without
any neurotic drawbacks is debatable in Freud's thought.
More precisely, the genital personality traits overlap with
other traits resulted from an early fixation during the
child's development.
In this regard, considering Aristotle's approach to
the human character, we notice, as discussed before, that
negative and positive qualities do coexist.

61.

This is to

Joseph F. Rychlack, Introduction to Personality and
Psychotherapy, p. 80.
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say, that one or more characteristics dominate the others
without eliminating their existence.

And if we assume that

the genital person is the "generous" man in Aristotle then
the "generous man" is not without certain dissatisfactions.
I

Therefore, the genital personality is an "idee-limite."
As-A-Matter-of-Language
Considering what Paul Ricoeur says that psychoanalysis
is a new language at our disposal, one might raise the
following question:

How do we know that Freud means by the

excess or the deficiency of the activities of the three
agents of the psyche what Aristotle means?
in the implicit side of Freud's writings.

The answer lies
L. Wittgenstein

in his book, Philosophical Grammar, says that a basic idea
is a rule which determines meaning within the language.62
In this regard, we can say that Aristotle demands one
language with one set of rules and Freud uses another
language.

But the key is the use of terms in each

language, i.e., the use of "vice" in Aristotle and the use
of "neurotic" or "psychotic" ego in Freud.

If so, then,

they have the same meaning in different languages.
give a simple everyday life example.

Let us

In the film, Fiddler

on the Roof, Teviah asks his wife Golda, "Do you love me?"
Golda's only answer was that she always washed his clothes,
cooked his dinners, and took care of their children.
62.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, trans
Antony Kerny (London: William Clowes & Sons Ltd.,
1974), p. 32.

Her
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answer means the same as the answer his daughter gave to
her Christian lover:

"Yes, I love you."

In our readings of Freud, nothing is detected which
shows Freud ever compared his thought with Aristotle's.
sut, undoubtedly, as mentioned before, Freud never detached
himself from the Western Greco-Roman traditions.

In this

regard, let us see how Freud relates the language of the
Middle Ages to his psychoanalytic language.

In describing

the notion of the "return of the repressed," he says,
[the repressed feelings] are stored up and enjoy
an unsuspected existence in a sort of shadow
kingdom, till they emerge like bad spirits and
take control of the body, which, as a rule under
the orders of the predominant egoconsciousness. 63
Freud uses the words "bad spirits" in reference to the
"mass hysteria" which used to occur among clergy and nuns
during the middle ages.

In other words, the return of the

repressed means what used to be called "possessions by the
devil."

So, in this respect, different words refer to the

same "basic idea," or, different words refer to the same
meaning, or the practice or the activity the words refer
to.
Having this in mind, the practice and the activity of
a person dominated by the "desiring id" is nothing but
63.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol I. p. 127.
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nself

indulgence," "rash" and "reckless" in the

Aristotelian sense; and, the practice and the activity of a
person dominated by the codes of the superego refers in
Aristotelian sense to a "deficient pleasure''; and, finally,
the activity and practice associated with an excess of
"ego" is what is called arrogance, boastfulness and vanity
in the Aristotelian sense.

From this we conclude that the

implicit meaning underlying the excess and deficient
activity of any of the three personality agents is "vice."
These practices and activities contribute to the "ruin" of
the person's ethical conduct in relation to himself or
herself as well as to his or her relation to society.
Extreme Denial as Vice Par Excellence
In the first chapter we discussed the state of
schizophrenia.

The link in the state of schizophrenia

between the "word presentation" (the conscious) and the
"thing presentation" (the unconscious) is cut off to an
extreme degree.

Also, we discussed that, according to

Freud, denial is a primitive mechanism which wards off the
external reality.

But due to the notion of "leakage" the

mechanism of denial is never complete and an absolute
I

schizophrenia is an "idee-limite. 11

And since denial of the

external world is never complete, we come to know that
there is a minimum acknowledgment of what is denied.

The

question we would like to address is: Why the person is not
able to continue encountering what is acknowledged in the
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external world?

In our opinion, the answer could be simply

stated, i.e., the lack of virtues, such as "the virtue of
compromise" and "the virtue of prudence" which the
psychoanalyst tries to reenact in the client.

Implied in

this comment is the lack of courage to face reality, the
lack of prudence to discern what to do at the right time
and in the right place, and the lack of temperance to
exercise self-control.

The person falls into a vicious

state of mind.
In this second chapter we have concerned ourselves
with the common places between Freud and Aristotle; common
places which show the crucial activities by which the
person assumes his or her "being in the world."

Also, we

alluded to what is vice according to Aristotle and how the
psychoanalytic language of Freud refers to the same "basic
idea."

As vice is implicit in Freud, so is denial implicit

in Aristotle.

This means that if the social external world

is denied, the person cannot fulfill his or her humanity,
i.e., the person is to a large extent unable to reason,
interact, incorporate values and live in participation with
his or her fellow humans.
Moreover, the external world which is responsible for
the differentiation of the ego and the superego, and which
tries to tame the aggressive sexual instincts of the
individual is to a large degree disavowed.

In relation to

the individual's self-fulfillment, the world in which this

84

individual tries to regain unity with the "lost object,"
i.e., the mother, is also lost and denied.

Instead of

indulging oneself in this necessary, unavoidable "tragic"
battle, the individual reverses this necessity into a world
of hallucination and regresses to the "auto-erotic" stage
which is the prerequisite to the emergence of the social
life.
Comparing this detrimental denial to other vices, such
as vanity, stinginess, rash, arrogance, foolhardy, envy,
lust, cowardice, etc., we notice that such vices although
they show an overriding tendencies over some virtues
possessed by the same person, yet, the person remains a
social being capable of participating, capable of
committing some virtuous acts.

Considering this, the

notion of as-a-matter-of-degree reemerges again; for if we
consider the above mentioned vices as vices which "ruin,"
it follows that an extreme denial is an extreme repression
or inhibition of what is called the "impulse of life."
Therefore, it is vice par excellence.

No wonder that

Goethe refers to denial as a satanic act.64

64.

Goethe, Faust, Trans Philip Wayne (New York: Penguine
Books Ltd., 1985), Part I, Sc. II.

CHAPTER THREE

Introduction
Our concern in this chapter is to answer the following
question: How do we encounter denial?

In order to answer

this question three important symptomatic notions will be
discussed: anxiety, separateness, and perception.
In discussing these three important notions we promise
no absolute clarity.

The limitations imposed on us are

inherent in the ambiguity of some fundamental principles.
Ambiguity may be "humiliating" in any philosophical or
psychological discussions, but it is also a fact of our
everyday life in which we inevitably learn how to feel at
home.

Freud writes,
We can console ourselves with the: thought that we
have been obliged to build our way out into the
dark.

If we are not wholly in error, other lines

of approach are bound to lead us into much the
same region and the time may then come when we
shall find ourselves more at home in it.1
How does Freud help us by maintaining this position?
Without denying the importance of deep speculative
1.

Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. J.
Strachey (New York: Avon Books, The Hogarth Press,
ltd., 1964), p. 588.
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theoretical issues, he simply wants us to make use of .what
is helpful for practical

reaso~s.

According to Freud,

since it is, for example, difficult to determine whether
darkness is the least light or light is the least darkness,
we just accept the most recurrent practical fact that light
is in the day time and darkness is at night.

We come to

affirm our position that in this discussion we are not
going to speculate whether the known or the denied reality
is completely presented to us with utmost clarity.

Our

concern is how persons reject and disavow what is painful
and intolerable.

In this connection, we will notice that

what is ambiguous in a certain expression or another
assumes a kind of meaning in form of symptoms.

Merleau-

Ponty interprets this notion in Freud's literature as
follows:
Ambiguity is of the essence of human existence,
and everything we live or think has always
several meanings ....

Existence is indeterminate

in itself by reason of its fundamental structure,
and in so far as it is the very process whereby
the hitherto meaningless takes on meaning ...
chance is transformed into reason in so far as it
is the act of taking up a de facto situation.2

2.

M. Merleau-Ponti, Phenomenoloy of Perception,
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York: The Humanities
Press, 1974), p. 169.
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.Having this in mind, an attempt at flight is a symptom of
denial which we encounter in different settings.

So let us

start with anxiety.

* * *
In sooth, I know not why I am so sad:
It wearies me; you say it wearies you;
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it,
What stuff 'tis made of, wherefore it is born,
I am to learn;
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me,
that I have much ado to know myself
(Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice
Act I, Sc I)
Anxiety
In the first chapter we mentioned that the realization
of the external world comes into being when the breast of
the mother has to be separated from the infant.

With such

a separation the infant starts to realize that the breast
is something over there, i.e., an object to be denied in
order to satisfy certain internal needs.

In other words,

desiring and attaining this object means minimizing the
excess of stimulation, i.e., achieving a certain
satisfactory degree of the "pleasure principle."

Also,

being over there the breast of the mother is a something
which is lost.

This is to say, something which is absent.

Having this in mind, the emergence of the external world
starts to have an impact on the infant.
the end of the auto-erotic stage.
about explaining this development?

This is known as

But how does Freud go
By answering this
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question we will come to have a grip on the notion of
anxiety.
Not only did Freud struggle in

expla~ning

the enigma

of the unconscious, but he also underwent great
intellectual pains in how to explain the realization of the
external world.

In his two papers, "Negation" and

"Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety", Freud comes up with
his explanation.

In "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" he

explains the notion of anxiety.

It is worth mentioning

that in neither paper does Freud tackle the notion of
denial.

But in these theoretically important papers, Freud

lays down the context by which we come to understand why
and how one can do away with the external world.

In this

regard, the notion of danger is very important, and it will
be discussed in due course.
Both papers have one common similarity; the notion of
the loss of object.

In other words, having an object which

is lost means the experience of something out there, and
this leads the infant to reality testing, i.e., a reality
out there external to oneself.

So, the contribution of

"Negation" and "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" to the
notion of denial is that in a psychotic state it
is the reaction to a loss which reality affirms,
but which the ego has to disavow, since it finds
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it insupportable.

Thereupon the ego breaks off

its relation to reality •... 3
In "Negation" Freud says, "But it is evident that a
precondition for the setting-up of reality testing is that
objects should have been lost ••.. 11 4

In the "Inhibitions,

symptoms and Anxiety" he gives us his conclusion,
The conclusion we have reached is that anxiety
comes to be a reaction to the danger of a loss of
an object •.. the first determinant of anxiety,
which the ego itself introduces, is loss of
perception of the object.5
How does he come to this conclusion?
It is not rare in Freud's literature to note that the
first five years of the life of the human being are the
most important as they contribute to later development.
Accordingly, in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" Freud
starts his discussion of anxiety by mentioning that birth
is the "prototype" of anxiety.

Being the "prototype" of

anxiety, we need to ask this question: What is the nature
of this birth anxiety?
psychological?

Or, is it biological or

Freud's answer is that the separation from

3.

Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. strachey,
(London, from 1953-), Vol. XIV, p. 233.

4.

s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XIX, p. 238.

5.

s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XX, pp. 169-170;
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the mother is understood biologically.6

In this regard,

anxiety is "an affective symbol which biological necessity
demands that a situation of danger should have. 117

In this

sense, birth anxiety has a "prototype" relation to danger.
Although it is biological, yet, ambiguously speaking, it is
a sort of anxiety whose nature Freud does not explicate.
aut, he tells us that it happens without explaining why or
how.

In other words, for Freud as for Nietzsche 8 things

happen simply because t:.hey happen; "What happens is that
the child's biological situation as a foetus is replaced ...
by a psychical object-relation to its mother. 119

So,

understanding it as prototypic of the danger situation,
i.e., the loss of object, i.e., the mother, is
"generalized" so that in the live of the person it refers
to the anxiety involved in any later "object losses."

This

is to say, anxiety acts upon the individual whenever the
threat of danger arises.

So, what the infant encounters is

two kinds of anxieties: 1) biologica110 (birth) and 2)
psychological (loss of object).
6.

Ibid, p. 151.

7.

Ibid, p. 134.

8.

In his Birth of Tragedy, F. Nietzsche criticizes
Euripedes for giving reasons to causes. Things happen
because they happen as Sophocles shows in Oedipus Rex.

9.

s.

10.

Freud does not give a name to this biological anxiety.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XX, p. 138.

91

Speaking of a sort of anxiety (biological), we need to
ask this question: does Freud mean that this kind of
anxiety is an interruption of a prenatal Nirvana?

If yes,

Freud does not explain what constitutes this interruption
and he does not explain why it happens.

But as he teaches

us "if we cannot see things clearly we will at least see
clearly what the obscurities are.nll

This prompts us to

pose two other questions: why are they obscure and
ambiguous?

Is ambiguity a reality?

Although it is worth

answering these questions, yet, they are not what really
concern us in this chapter.
Now, what does Freud mean by danger?
refer to?

Or, what does he

In the body of "Inhibitions, Symptoms and

Anxiety" he maintains,
The situation ... which [the infant] regards as a
danger and against which it wants to be
safeguarded is that of non-satisfaction, of a
growing tension due to need, against which it is
helpless ....

The situation of non-satisfaction

in which the amounts of stimulation rise to an
unpleasurable height without its being possible
for them to be mastered psychically or discharged
must for the inf ant be analogous to the
experience of being born ... must be a repetition
of the situation of danger.
11.

s.

What both situations

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XX, p. 124.
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have in common is the economic disturbance caused
by an accumulation of amounts of stimulation
which requires to be disposed of.

It is this

factor, then, which is the real essence of the
danger.12
In this sense the notion of danger is associated with what
heightens the unpleasurable excitations.

Due to the

infant's helplessness, mastering the situation whether on
the biological or the psychological level is an
impossibility.

So, to restore a constant level of

excitation there must be an object, someone out-there to
change this non-satisfaction to satisfaction.

By

experience the infant comes to realize the presence of
another who is able to end this non-satisfaction.

The

inner disturbances are the means by which the mother is
called in order to satisfy this emerging need.

So it is

the absence of the mother which is experienced as danger;
and the infant's kicking and screaming are signs of danger
as well as means of self preservation.
When the inf ant finds out by experience that an
external, perceptible object can put an end to
the dangerous situation which is reminiscent of
birth, the content of the danger it fears is
displaced from the economic situation on to the
condition which determined that situation, viz.,
12.

Ibid, p. 137.
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the loss of object.

It is the absence of the

mother that is now the danger; and as soon as
that danger arises the infant gives the signal of
anxiety •...

This change constitutes the first

great step forward in the provision made by the
infant for its self-preservation.13
Having this in mind, loss of object

absence of the

mother -- is what determines the experience of an
"external, perceptible object."

This means that it is

through the absence of the mother that her presence is
recognized.

Moreover, giving the signal for help, the

infant not only maintain self-preservation, but also learns
how to master this unpleasurable situation.
In this context, we come to know how Freud brings "the
significance of the real external world" to his theory.
That said, another crucial issue should be considered.

It

is the realization of an external reality which brings the
infant into the state of being in the world.

Without this

process, the infant would have stayed in the "Nirvana,"
i.e., "I am all and the all is me."

In this regard, we

come to an equation that an extreme denial is not being in
the world, i.e., a regression to the auto-erotic stage
rather than a "progressive" movement into the world, i.e.,
subject/object relation by which the reality testing is
accomplished.
13.

Ibid. p. 138.
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Maintaining this position, we understand that maternal
care is not only the agent of satisfaction, but it is that
bY which the infant experiences security.

Parental care

does not allow an extreme catastrophic situation to take
place.

We also learn that the physiological satisfaction

is "transposed" to a psychological presence, i.e. the
presence of the mother -- a "psychical object relation."
so, prior to the absence of the mother, the infant does not
experience its ego, nor does he experience a "meaningful
perception."
anxiety.

Loss of object is the prime determiner of

By going through this anxiety the infant comes in

touch with the external world for self-preservation.
Anxiety, absence, presence, reality testing are
inevitable conditions in the progressive development of the
infant.

The question we would like to pose is: how does

the child learn to live his paradox?

In Beyond the

Pleasure Principle, Freud introduces us to the game which
he considers a "great cultural achievement."

It is the

effective entry of the child into a world of
absence/presence.

In other words, the child learns the

acceptance of the "loss which reality affirms."
Visiting his sister Sophie, Freud had the opportunity
to observe his nephew playing a game invented by himself.
The little "good boy" takes any small object and throws it
away.

Doing so, he utters the expression

0-0-0-0-

which

means, according to his mother, "Fort," i.e., "gone."

Then
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searching for his lost object, and, upon finding it the
child joyfully expresses himself by saying "da" which means
"there."

Freud maintains that through this game the child

comes to master the painful reality of the loss of object;
a painful reality followed by the reappearance of the
object.

"Fort-da was related to the child's great cultural

achievement •.•• The instinctual renunciation which he had
in allowing his mother to go away without protesting.n14
In this sense the child reconciles with reality by
experiencing that absence is a livable reality.

What makes

it promising is the disappearance of the mother which is
followed by ·her appearance.

In this connection, the child

develops a 'link' between what is present and what is
absent.

This is the end of the auto-erotic stage.

Following Freud's train of thought, we notice that the
end of the erotic stage is itself something that is lost.
The ego develops its relation with the external as well as
with the internal world.

These two worlds exist to the ego

as that which "appear" and "disappear".
world.

The ego is in the

Being in the world it develops the readiness for

accepting the dialectic of presence/absence as a reality.
This game is the art of making what is tragic as a
promising livable entity.
The game "Fort-Da" contributes to another order in the
life of the child.
14.

s.

It is the order of language.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XVII, p. 15.

"Fort"
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and "Da" are two expression of double meaning.

say, they are equivocal.

This is to

Paul Ricoeur explains this,

By the same token language itself is from the
outset and for the most part distorted: it means
something other than what it says, it has a
double meaning.

It is equivoca1.15

In this vein, "Fort-Da" means something other than "there"
and "gone."

The expression refers to absence/presence.

More deeply, it refers to what this absence/presence refers
to.

It is the mastery of being in the world.
After this brief discussion of the notion of anxiety,

we come to understand that the drama of life as described
by Freud is a paradoxical one.

It is from the pain of

separation that an infant moves towards the pleasure of
mastery: and from this pleasure of mastery it becomes a
being in the world who progressively moves towards death.
Why are we thrown into this world?

To this question, Freud

does not give us any answer.16
Since we are destined to being in the world, denial in
its extreme sense is contrary to the progressive movements
of the infant's life.

It is facilitated by two major

15.

Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 7.

16.

We refer the reader to David Bakan's, Sigmund Freud
and the Jewish Mystical Traditions (London: o. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958). Bakan argues that
Freud's psychoanalysis is deeply rooted in the Jewish
mystical tradition.
From Bakan's perspective on could
find an answer to this question, i.e., a theological
interpretation of Freud's psychoanalysis.
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factors:

the mechanism of regression and the absence of

parental care.
effects:

Absence of parental care has the following

a) Blocks a healthy discovery of object

relationship; b) Incapacitates the person to deal with the
demands impinging from the external world; c) Gives way to
the immediate gratification of the blind forces of the id;
d) Prohibits the playfulness which leads to a healthy
mastery of the surrounding world; e) Disrupts the use of
consistent language; and f) Disturbs what is rational or
articulate.

Having this in mind, we can assume the

position that denial is set into motion as a result of a
certain high degree of anxiety.

This anxiety is developed

as a reaction to what is perceived by the agent as an
intolerable danger.

We also come to realize that "loss of

object" is the prime determinant of anxiety.

So, what

becomes the real issue in this context is the notion of
separateness.

This is the point to be discussed in the

next section.

* * *
Good night, good night! Parting is such sweet
sorrow.
That I shall say good night till it be morrow.
Shakespeare
Romeo and Juliet
Act II, Sc. II
Separateness
Before we start, an important point should be
mentioned.

It has become very clear that in Freud's

thought isolating one notion from another is in a practical
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sense extremely difficult due to the inter-relatedness and
the interdependence of all psychic phenomena.

This implies

that we can distinguish them in their unity which underlies
what is distinct in them.

Metaphorically speaking, it is

like a theme in a symphony put in different settings with
different variations.
The mastery by the child of the dialectic absence/
presence can be rephrased into a mastery of "separation"
from the mother.

This is to say, the "loss which reality

affirms" assures the infant's mode of being in the world.
In other words, the physical and the psychological distance
assumed by the separation process is also understood as a
mode of relating to another.
separation.

So, relationships imply

E. ortigues says that the separation between

the infant and the mother is that which gives their
relation its significance.1 7

That said, we can adopt the

assumption that denial of separateness is denial of
relationships.
In the first chapter we discussed three notions of
denial, namely,
1)

Denial A (Schizophrenia)

2)

Denial B (Neurosis as came to be realized in
Freud's study of Fetishism.)

17.

E. & M.C. Ortigues, Oedipe Africian, "n.p.", Paris,
1966, p. 70.
"Comme on voit, ce qui est "seperateur"
entre la mere et l'enfant, c'est d'abord ce qui·
signifie leur relation."
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3)

Denial

c

(The denial of the nonexistence of the

penis in the female genitalia.

It is an

unavoidable happening in the normalcy of
development in every child.)
we also need to bear in mind that the boundaries between
neurosis and psychosis oscillate and depend on the degree
of regression, and, also, depend on the degree of readiness
to deny in the individual.

so, in discussing specifically

the neurotic denial, it is not meant to refer only to
fetishism.

This is because underlying the notion of

fetishism lies the denial of separation; taking into
consideration that a person takes the fetish as a symbol of
what was lost.

In most general terms, Freud explains the

person's generalized attitude as follows.

He says,

It has been quite correctly pointed out that a
child gets the idea of a narcissistic injury
through a bodily loss from the experience of
losing his mother's breast after sucking, from
the daily surrender of his faeces and, indeed,
even from his separation from the womb at birth.
Nevertheless, one ought not to speak of a
castration complex until this idea of a loss has
become connected with male genitals.18
So we develop a generalized attitude -- symbolic mediation
which qualifies the blurred line of demarcation between
18.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XIX, p. 144.
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neuroses and psychoses.

In other words, in neuroses the

ego loses to some extent its synthetic function.

How?

Freud gives us the answer in his paper "Splitting of
the Ego in the Defensive Process" in which he emphasizes
the fact that what is at issue is the ego's rejection of
reality while it maintains some acceptance of its
perception of another portion of reality.

This partial

rejection of reality shows a connection between denial,
reality testing and separateness.
painful, i.e., what is denied.

Separateness is what is

As a result of rejecting

this painful experience the ego loses the distinction
between the self and the world outside, or, the object
relation.
the object.

This is to say, a "fusion" between the self and
But, what makes this fusion possible?

answer is the "wish."

Freud's

He defines it as

A current of this kind in the [psychical]
apparatus starting from unpleasure and aiming at
pleasure, we have termed a 'wish'; and we have
asserted that only a wish is able to set the
apparatus in motion and that the course of
excitation in it is automatically regulated by
feelings of pleasure and unpleasure.19
The motion in the context of denial of separateness is
regressive.

19.

s.

Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 637.
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Now, let us pose the case that may happen in many
educational settings.

Oftentimes, it is noticed that some

students strive hard to be "A" students.

Let us suppose

that these students like to be considered as unique in
their own right.

A teacher may observe that some students

feel threatened amidst such intense competitive atmosphere.
As a reaction these students search for a haven and desire
to replace this undesirable atmosphere by the safety of an
unconditional submission to the teacher's will.

In this

case, they become like a fetish who replaces the loss which
reality affirms by a thing such as a handkerchief.

They

start to idealize the teacher with the belief that this
person has the ability to make this unbearable reality a
soft one.
So, considering this, their excellent achievements are
not due to their tireless efforts, but their reliance on
the teacher to act as their "ego-function."

But let us

assume that at a certain time this teacher resigns, gets
transferred, or gets sick and can no longer be there.

Or

let us also assume that the teacher is one of those who
respect individual differences and a reasonable
independency.

In this situation, it would be remarkably

noticeable that these students get frustrated and start
complaining about work, learning, and relationships.
Actually, what is really the cause of frustration is not
work, learning, or the low quality of these relationships,

102
but, firstly, the ego's immaturity in relation to its
object, and, secondly, the withdrawal of the teacher who
was adopted as a personal ego.

These students are not able

to handle the demands of reality; they become overwhelmed,
helpless, and finally, expose either a partial or a massive
denial of what is perceived as unpleasant.

In her article

"Denial and Repression," E. Jacobson refers to this "meek
submission" as the "introjection" of another ego to
oneself . 20
Since at school we don't find extreme cases of
schizophrenia (massive denial), we wish to restrict our
discussion to partial denial.

It is a partial alienation

which "aims at denying the existence of the particular
event that occasioned the outbreak of insanity.

But

actually every neurotic does the same with some fragment of
reality.n21

How do we encounter this neurotic

manifestation?

In the case presented, it is expected that

after the withdrawal of the teacher's support, one of the
most recurrent symptoms of denial which is expected to
appear is the wish to sleep, i.e., the regression to a
dreamy state.

It is a regression by which the subject

undoes the pain of separateness by creating the illusion
that the "object" cannot be "lost."
20.

Edith Jacobson, "Denial and Repression," Journal of
American Psychoanalytic Association, October, 1957,
No. 4, Vol. 5, p. 69.

21.

S. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 13.
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The wish to sleep, according to Freud, is "the factor
of withdrawal from the external world [which makes)
possible the regressive character of representation in
dreams. 11 2 2

From this we can understand, as Freud implies,

that the unconscious wish is also effective during daytime.
It is like a magnet which attracts what is unpleasurable at
the present to what is still infantile and pleasurable in
the depth of the psyche.

Freud maintains, "a wish which is

represented in a dream must be an inf anti le one. 1123
students in such a state of mind move along with this
regression to a state where separateness is diminished; a
state of "I-am-all" or the state of "the-world-is-me."
This shows itself by observing their expected behavior.
They
1)

absent themselves from classes with the excuse of
being tired and need some sleep.

2)

use alcohols, drugs, etc ... , as a real instigator
of a dreamy state.

3)

sit in class dozing off; pulled by two opposite
poles: listening and not listening, seeing and
not seeing.

4)

rebel against the teacher's class material and
the school system because they see the school as
a boring setting.

22.

s.

23.

Ibid, p. 592.

Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 629.
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5)

fantasize a more gratifying reality as a
substitute for the painful existing one.

6)

lose the skill or art of living and tend to be
idealistic in their inclinations, i.e., the world
must be a loving one; a most beautiful Nirvana.

considering these points, it is obvious how the pleasure
principle takes hold of the student's judgement, attitude,
and perception.

What is considered as normal in dealing

with their everyday life is "submitted to abnormal
treatment 11 24 of the unconscious wish to regress to either
the "auto-erotic" or to a "narcissistic" stage.

In both

stages there is immediate gratification, fusion of the
subject/object relation, and a replacement of the painful
external reality to an altered state of perception.
To sum up, separation from the mother is the first
determinant of anxiety.

It is an anxiety caused by our

experience of danger which is associated with the absence
of the mother upon the emergence of inner needs.

Growing

from infancy to childhood, the child experiences learning
of keeping up with the tragedy he was brought to.

This is

accomplished by parental care, and by games like "Fort-Da"
by which the child makes out of this life a promising and a
livable tragedy.
But, in spite of this splendid conquest of the
external reality, persons carry within themselves what is
24.

Ibid, p. 636.
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inherent in the human psyche -- the dominance of the
pleasure principle.

Facing an intolerable danger,

individuals regress to stages where they do away with what
is painful.

One of these anxiety provoking situations is

the denial of separateness from the world.

For these

individuals "parting" becomes a sorrowful event but lacks
the "sweet" mastery of absence/ presence.

He thought he saw an Elephant
That practiced on a fife:
He looked again, and found it was
A letter from his wife
"At length I realize," he said
"The bitterness of life!"
Lewis Carroll
The Gardener's song
Perception
Freud, a revolutionary of his time, gives a new
formula of perception.

In his outline of Psychoanalysis he

says,
The perceptual periphery of the cortex of the ego
can be stimulated to a much greater extent from
inside as well; internal events such as sequences
of ideas and intellective processes can become
conscious; and a special apparatus becomes
necessary in order to distinguish between the two
possibilities -- that is, what is known as
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reality-testing.

The equation "perception

=

reality (external world) no longer holds.25
understanding the content of Freud's new formula one must
ask the following question:
this "special apparatus?"

what operation takes place in
The answer lies in the principle

which regulates the process of mental functioning.

Freud

calls it the "pleasure principle" whose responsibility is
to keep a constant quantity of excitation.

This is in

reaction to another principle which sets the mental
apparatus in an opposite excitatory direction called the
11

unpleasure principle" whose "final outcome coincides with

lowering of that tension. 11 26

Underlying these two

principles an inherent force is embedded in the psyche
which gives both of these principles the power to activate
themselves.

Freud calls this force "compulsion to repeat."

Considering this ambivalence in the nature of the
psyche we also come to understand that the agents of the
psyche are "semi-independent."

Every activity has its

counterpart within itself and outside itself.

In his

paper, "Formulation Regarding the Two Principles in Mental
Functioning," Freud describes this as follows, "Just as the
pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish, work towards gaining
pleasure and avoiding 'pain,' so the reality-ego need do
25.

s. Freud, An outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. James
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), p. 42.

26.

S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. J.
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1949), p. 1.
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nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself
against damage. 11 2 7

In other words, what is "useful"

belongs to the domain of the "unpleasure principle" adopted
by the reality-ego only as a step for future gratification,
i.e., for the "pleasure principle."

This may seem

paradoxical; but it seems plausible considering the fact
which Freud gives us in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: what
is unpleasure for one system is pleasure for the other.
Having briefly laid down the two principles which
regulate the movement of the psychic apparatus, we would
like to pose this question: what are the components of
these two principles?

The answer is the perceptions as

they are preserved as "traces" in the unconscious and
preconscious memory of the psyche,
We possess a system [Perceptual-Conscious] PeptCs, which receives perceptions but retains no
permanent trace of them, so that it can react
like a clean sheet to every new perception; while
the permanent traces of the excitations which
have been received are preserved in 'mnemic
systems' lying behind the perceptual system.28
But how do these perceptions act as a catalyst to the
"wish" which, as discussed before, has the components of

27.

s.

28.

Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 176.

Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 4, p. 18.
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forwarding itself to satisfaction?
in the Interpretation of Dreams.

Freud gives the answer
He says,

An essential component of this experience of
satisfaction is a particular perception •.. the
mnemic image of which remains associated thence
forward with the memory trace of the excitation
produced by the need.

As a result of the link

that has thus been established, next time this
need arises a psychical impulse will at once
energy which will seek to recathect the mnemic
image of the perception and to re-evoke the
perception itself, that is to say, to reestablish the situation of the original
satisfaction.

An impulse of this kind is what we

call a wish.29
There are three important points we gather from what is
already mentioned: firstly, the external world is what
makes human beings a "social animal."

Secondly, although

the unconscious traces are internal within the human
psyche, their origin is based on the conscious or
unconscious interaction with the objective world.

This is

to say, the experience of the objective world is
"internalized" though impressions and perceptions, i.e.,
stored as memories.

This leaves us with the notion that as

human beings we are memory people.
29.

s.

Thirdly, the

Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 604-605.
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dialectical tension that the psyche undergoes creates a
state of paradoxes eased by the interference of primarily
the "reality-testing ego" which keeps a harmonious
relationships with the external world.

How?

By diplomacy,

or, the "art" of survival as discussed in the second
chapter.
But before getting into how we encounter denial in
perception, we must glance at how our perceptions normally
act upon the world.

In other words, knowing what is

normally processed, we come to understand more clearly the
pathological process.
In this connection, we need to refer to the notion of
absent/present as shown earlier.

To recapitulate, it is

worth mentioning that the "Fort-Da" game is what
facilitates the perception of what is present.

More

clearly, there is a "link" with what is absent or lost
which makes it present; present somewhere.

Whether we can

say that this "link" is what causes "imagination" is not to
be considered in this discussion.

But to be faithful to

the line of this discussion, suffice to say that the "link"
implies "relationship," i.e., "separation."

Also, we come

to understand that due to the disruptive powers within the
psyche, perception, in this sense, is dependent on
different factors.

G.B. Levitas, an authority in

psychoanalysis, maintains,
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The human being's reaction to the world about him
is at first very simple.

As he matures, however,

his perception comes to be dependent on many
factors: his background and language, temperament
and role, physical and emotional conditions.

The

reality of what he sees depends upon the way in
which he interprets phenomena.30
Freud is Kantian in this regard.

This means that the

"intention" behind the perception of the thing is what
determines its interpretation.

Furthermore, the "Fort-Da"

game shows us that what is perceived by the child is not
only what is present, but an absence "signified" by
presence.

Separation, therefore, is perceived as an

occurrence of a presence which is absent.

For the child

what is absent is a prospective presence; it is a presence
in "intention."

Having this in mind, we can assume the

position that for Freud the person's relation to the
external reality as something separate is perceived in a
symbolic way.

No wonder that psychoanalysis is a tool by

which "reduction of illusion" is achieved.
From this discussion, what can we come up with about
perception in respect to denial?

With the development of

the reality-testing ego, perception of the external world
becomes a tool of relationships.

30.

But, with the weakening

G.B. Levitas, The World of Psychology (New York:
Georges Brazillen, 1963), Vol. I, p. 160.
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of the reality-testing ego the perception of the outer
world is blurred, and the chances for the mechanism of
denial is strengthened.

Why?

The ego withdraws itself and

becomes "insensitive" to the stimulations impinging from
the external world and thereby lowering the level of
consciousness.

Consequently, in an extreme case, the ego

reconstructs a perceptual reality of its own, and its
orientation to the outer world is minimized.

In the case

of a neurotic denial, part of the external reality is
replaced by a perception of another.
In order to give an example of neurotic denial, let us
concern ourselves with the notion of humor.

In his paper

"Humor," Freud considers humor as the "triumph of
narcissism" and also of the "pleasure principle."

It is an

assertion of the ego in the face of a painful situation.
Freud says,
These last two characteristics, the denial of the
claim of reality and the triumph of the pleasure
principle, cause humor to approximate to the
regressive or reactionary processes ....

By its

repudiation of the possibility of suffering, it
takes its place in the great series of methods
devised by the mind of man for evading the
compulsion to suffer a series which begins with
neurosis and culminates in delusions, and
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includes intoxication, self-induced states of
abstraction and ecstasy.31
Accordingly, humor is that by which a person wards off an
impending suffering by "repudiating" it.
here!

It means: "Look

This is all that this seemingly dangerous world

amounts to. 113 2

In an educational setting, it is often

noticed that some students under the pressure of the final
exams or any distressing classroom situation burst out into
a fit of laughter for no reasons known to them.
Sometimes, warding off a fragment of reality takes the
shape of certain perceptual images resulting from
unconscious phantasies.

Students of this sort are led by

certain images by which teachers, if they are the cause of
distress, are identified with a fictional image that may
lead to humor.

This fictional image is characterized by

identifying one trait with the whole person.

In his short

paper, "A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession,"
Freud describes these obsessive images as "caricatures"
which derogatorily "replace a whole person by one of their
organs 11 33 or by a joking expression such as, for example,
the teacher is "all ears" or a "walking encyclopedia" or a
"nobody."

In this case, it is the "internal perceptions"

which "yield sensations of processes arising in the most
31.

S. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, p. 215.

3 2.

Ibid, p. 2 2 0.

33.

Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 346.
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diverse and certainly also in the deepest strata of the
:mental apparatus." 34

So, these internal perceptions stored

in the deepest levels of the psyche provide us with some
notions about the "readiness" to activate the defense
:mechanism of denial.

They also imply that the readiness to

deny is associated with the "character" of the person.

In

this sense, we have in mind the typology of personality
traits discussed in chapter two.

More precisely,

unconscious fixation on certain perceptions seeking
. satisfaction arises to eclipse the painful reality, and,
consequently, the mechanism of denial operates by warding
off the impinging painful perceptions.
It is true what Shakespeare says in Hamlet "the
readiness is all."

This works both ways; as already

mentioned there is the "wish" to deny, and, also, there
exist internal and external disturbances which facilitate
the need to deny.

As Louis Linn puts it, "Just as

disturbances of perception facilitate denial, so does a
need for denial result in disturbances of perception. 11 35
This means that the need for denial causes "inexact
observations."

According to Freud, what causes this

inexact observation is an "expression of the rebellion of
34.

s. Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 11-12.

35.

Louis Linn, "The Role of Perception in the Mechanism
of Denial," Journal of American Psychoanalytic
Association, October, 1953, No. 4, Vol. 1, p. 695.
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the id against the outer world."

Subjugated by its two

masters the reality-ego shows an "unwillingness to adapt
itself to necessity. 11 36

In this psychological state of

mind students show a tendency to:
1)

be careless in regard to their school work,

2)

be forgetful,

2)

fantasize and to substitute reality by wishful
thinking.

As Freud puts it, "It is from this world of fantasy that
neurosis draws the material for recreating the world afresh
according to its desires, and it finds this material there,
as a rule, by way of a regression to an earlier period in
real life. 11 37

The neurotic denial makes possible a partial

withdrawal of the quantity of "cathexis" from the external
or internal world.

This withdrawal of cathexis causes

diversion of the person's attention as a defense against an
impinging anxiety-provoking situation.

As a result, the

perception of a given situation is withdrawn and the ego
under the influence of the pleasure principle reconstructs
a hallucinatory or a fantasized nonthreatening reality.
Consequently, these unhappy students live in the reality of
their graduation day rather than the reality of finals.
Fantasy or suppression of a given stimulus is not
denial per se.

Either can be the vehicle of a "central

36.

S. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, p. 279.

37.

Ibid, p. 281.
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wish" which is "infantile" in nature by which regression to
a state of "pleasure" is achieved.

This is to say, the

quantity of excitation impinging from the external world is
reduced to a minimum.
As mentioned earlier, according to Freud, the first
step to civilization is the renunciation of instinctual
demands.

The id's impulses are like "mobs," "blind" and

know no morality.

But, although a part of the ego is in

the id, yet, in some sense, the id is external to the
reality-ego.

For self-preservation the reality-ego tries

to ward off painful or threatening impulses from the id in
the same way that it wards off painful or threatening
stimuli from the external world.

In this regard we may

consider that denial of the external reality occurs only
when this reality, though not painful as it is, evokes the
desires of the id which constitute, on their own terms, a
threat to the moral principles of the student concerned.
Let us imagine a female student who finds herself in a
classroom with an extremely handsome teacher.

Having him

in front of her stimulates her sexual desires towards him.
But, how can this be, since she was taught that a student
should not sexually desire her teacher?

This student falls

in conflict, torn between her attraction to her teacher and
her moral values.

Being a good student with a respectable

average, she has to find a solution.
does she seek?

But what solution

The solution she seeks is the denial of the
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cause of her intolerable anxiety.
teacher's physical presence.

This is to say, the

She might close her eyes,

iook constantly at her notebook or comes up with any other
means by which her visual perception is "repressed."
conducting herself in such a way, we can say that she
"heard" and "understood" the lecture very well.

In his

paper, "Psychogenic Visual Disturbance," Freud explains an
extreme case,
It would appear as though repression on the part of
the ego had gone too far and poured away the baby with
the bath-water, for the ego now flatly refuses to see
anything at all, since the sexual interests in looking
have so deeply involved the faculty of vision.

The

other presentation of the situation, however, is
probably closer to the fact, the aspects in which we
see the active part in the process played by the
repressed scoptophilia.

It is the revenge, the

indemnification of the repressed impulse, thus
withheld from further psychical development, that it
can succeed in so boldly asserting its mastery over
the organ which serves it.38
The case refers not only to this partial denial, but
to a more general understanding of relationships or "coexistence."

Having the visual perception as an important

vehicle in object relationship, what is really being
38.

Ibid, p. 110.
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frustrated here is her "co-existence" with another.

This

frustration of emotions for one reason or another "electsn
the disruption of visual perception as a mode of
expression.

So the partial loss of "co-existence," i.e., a

way of refusing to live a certain reality, fear of breaking
the moral laws, is "translated" by the suppression of
perception.

More generally, we observe a tendency to break

away from life itself.

To repeat ourselves, thinking

psychoanalytically means thinking an "equivocal" verbal or
nonverbal language.

In other words, what is important is

what language refers to.
Carrying on with the language of psychoanalysis, a
traumatic experience finds expression in different
symptoms.

The ego encounters the involvement of the blind

id with any perceptual faculty and decides to abandon a
conscious control over the situation.

A symptom is formed

conveying a message of either rejecting reality by blocking
the perception of it or rejecting reality by inducing that
which fulfills the craving to recapture a dreamy state.
Both have one common denominator, i.e., the triumph of the
pleasure principle.

For example, a person who stops eating

symbolizes, as Merleau-Ponty says, the breaking away from
life, since the "swallowing symbolizes the movement of
existence which carries events and assimilates them; the
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patient is unable, literally, to 'swallow' the prohibition
which has been imposed on her. 11 39
A parallel to these symptoms of denial can be
encountered in gluttons, alcoholics and users of drugs.
Injecting food, alcohol or drugs into the body symbolizes
the infant's sucking the mother's breast as a prelude to a
sleeping state.

In his book, The Psychoanalysis of

Elation, B. Levin gives us detailed cases on how sometimes
a person achieves denial by eating and becoming like the
"jolly fat man. 11 40

In other words, he is like an infant

who captures an identical state of infantile narcissism.
This "jolly fat man" captures an identical state of
infantile narcissism.

The French saying "Apres moi le

deluge" precisely describes his attitude; an attitude which
explicitly uncovers an extreme destructive attitude to the
existence of the world of relationships.
Conclusion
Denial is a primitive mechanism.

It is that which

makes regression, the inexplicable phenomenon, possible.
Being primitive means that its existence in the human
psyche is prior to the "cleavage" of the ego and the
superego.

So encountering denial also means encountering

39.

M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 160.

40.

B.D. Levin, The Psychoanalysis of Elation (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1950), p. 62.
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that which causes it, namely, separation, anxiety and
perception.
These three important notions are inextricably
interwoven.

One implies the occurrence of the other.

separateness implies anxiety; and anxiety refers to a
threat of an impinging "danger" which starts as the mother
being absent.

The absence of the mother becomes the

"prototype" of all impending danger whether from the
external or from the internal world.

Experiencing extreme

anxiety leads to a distortion in the person's perception.
The ego withdraws its control and becomes an instrument of
the repressed impulses.

consequently, denial of the so

called dangerous situation is bound to take place.
Now, what is the weapon we need to possess in facing
danger?

The answer is possessing the virtues.

need fo-r this "excellence" to be lived?
virtuous life.
character.

What do we

The answer is: a

This implies building the virtuous

For Freud, attaining a virtuous life is not an

easy task,
Actions and consciously expressed opinions are as
a rule enough for practical purposes in judging
men's characters.

Actions deserve to be

considered first and foremost; for many impulses
which force their way through to consciousness
are even then brought to nothing by the real
forces of mental life before they can mature into

120

deeds.

In fact, such impulses often meet with no

psychical obstacles to their progress, for the
very reason that the unconscious is certain that
they will be stopped at some other stage.

It is

in any case instructive to get to know the much
trampled soil from which our virtues proudly
spring. 41
That said, the purpose we hope to achieve in the next
chapter is the answer to the following question:

what are

some of the virtues implied in Freud's psychoanalysis?

41.

S. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 659.

CHAPTER FOUR
Section One
--What thou hast inherited from thy fathers,
acquire it to make it thine
(Goethe, Faust, Part One)

Introduction
This chapter is comprised of two sections.

The first

deals with the notion of common sense, and the second deals
with two major issues in psychoanalysis: psychopathology
and the theory of cure.

In both sections we venture to

answer the following question: What are the virtues implied
in Freud's psychoanalysis?

In order to strengthen our

investigation we have decided to draw a parallel or to
search for an articulation between what is implied as
virtue in Freud's thought and Aristotle's Ethics.
As to the section on common sense, our purpose is to
show the profound quality of Freud's thinking which served
him well as a means to articulate different disciplines in
one discipline called psychoanalysis.

To prove our point

we are going to consider Freud's way in approaching the
subjects of slips, dreams and persons.

Reaching a

considerable clarity on these issues, we will see what is
the virtue in Aristotle's Ethics that qualifies Freud's
121
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style of thinking.
This leads us to the second section in which we see
how Freud's thought is put in action and verified by human
experience as it unfolds in the clinical setting.

As we go

on with our investigation, we will also observe how Freud's
ideas on psychopathology and on the theory of cure have
profoundly added a new dimension to the notion of virtue,
the unconscious virtues.
Common Sense
In this section we are going to consider a direction
in Freud's literature which has been overlooked by many
researchers.

It is a direction we need to see in order to

understand how being-in-the-world is so important in
Freud's theory.

Although it does not obey the method of

theoretic speculation; yet it is considered to be an
indispensable catalyst for any deliberate methods.

This

direction is called "common sense," or "good sense," or
"native shrewdness."

It is, as mentioned earlier in the

second chapter, acquired from the experience of mere
living.

So the major question to be answered is: how does

Freud put this "native shrewdness" to use in his
psychoanalytic search?
Freud's interest in clinical search did not eclipse
his interest in the remarkable resources that human
cultures have offered throughout history.

In his own

production, he reproduces these resources and articulates
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them in his psychoanalytic findings.

In other words, he

makes them relevant as "evidence" and "devices" for an
underlying depth and also for "far-reaching" speculations.
This is one of the reasons which makes psychoanalysis
"intuitively graspable" as we encounter it challenging the
logic of the illogic.
Being-in-the-world simply implies not denying the
world.

On a commonsensical level oftentimes we use what is

given to us.

Although we reach a point of experiencing

overwhelming contradictions and inconsistencies for which
we are unable to provide ourselves with intellectual
explanations, our "practice" and "experience" serve us as
tools by which we come to possess a "felt-meaning" of the
context of these situations.

Having a comprehension of

this context redeems our threatened attitudes by keeping a
relationship with the world.

It is not uncommon to

experience a person who is able to make a desperate
situation livable by referring to the proverbial French
statement "c'est la vie."
How does Freud defend this commonsensical stance?

The

intellectual scientific circles of Freud's time accused his
psychoanalysis of being nothing but "mere talk" or
"exchange of words."

To this he responds,

Words and magic were in the beginning one and the
same thing, and even today words retain much of
their magical powers ..•. Words call forth
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emotions and are universally the means by which
we influence our fellow creatures. 1
What Freud implies is not the needless use of words but
communication, relationship and uncovering of attitudes.
communication is crucial to analysis.

In this regard,

Freud maintains that the patient "will make the
communications necessary to the analysis only under the
conditions of a special affective relationship to the
physician; in the presence of a single person to whom he
was indifferent he would become mute. 11 2

Freud continues to

defend himself by saying that the importance of
psychological attitude in which resides an important
development of a complicated organism is "foreign" to those
scientists who are accustomed to give anatomical, chemical
or physical explanations to phenomena.

He says to those

scientists, "for this reason a psychological attitude of
mind is still foreign to you, and you are accustomed to
regard it with suspicion, to deny it a scientific status,
and to leave it to the general public, poets, mystics, and
philosophers."3
The underlying crucial point emphasized is that
relationships are pivotal in the process of comprehending
1.

Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to
Psychoanalysis, Trans. Joan Riviere (Garden City, New
York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1943), p. 19.

2.

Ibid.

3.

Ibid .

I

p . 21.
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and living in the world around us.

But, sometimes, words

used in communication seems to be unintelligible.

Their

occurrence gives the impression of an accidental happening
stemming from no apparent beliefs, attitudes and conscious
intentions.

As mentioned earlier, for Freud there is an

inherent readiness to achieve or to express something.
This is to say, there is an "idea of design," i.e., a
tendency which has to achieve its purpose.

R. Audi says,

"there can be unconscious wants and unconscious beliefs in
a sense at least very close to the ordinary sense of •want'
and 'belief' ....

These can figure in motivational

explanations in fundamentally the same way as conscious
'beliefs' and

1

wants. 1 "4

These unconscious beliefs and

wants are not strangers to our everyday life experiences.
It needs no hard proofs to see that what seems to be an
accidental utterance shows to every common person that
there is a disguised intention underlying it.

We,

oftentimes, hear children exposing a teasing tone to each
other when indirectly a child unconsciously substitutes a
word for another.

Detecting such unconscious intention is

something we experience and understand from our everyday
common sense experience, and Freud uses these experiences
as evidences to his theory.

How?

In his article "Freudian commonsense", Adam Morton
4.

Robert Audi, "Psychoanalytic Explanation and the
Concept of Rational Action," Monist, Vol. 56, No. 3
(July 1972), p. 446.
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maintains that Freud allows in his explanations the
contributions of the everyday experiences to his theory:
nthe way in which Freud applies the theory give us some
idea of how to expand commonsense so as to obtain our
intuitive ..• " 5 descriptions of personalities, characters
and incidents.

In his "Psychology of Errors'', Freud

encourages us to learn from phenomena which are frequent
and observed not only in neurotics but in very healthy
individuals.

More precisely, he makes us aware that there

is a kind of knowledge which is non-theoretical.

In this

connection, he makes use of it and gives what it deserves
of intellectual explanations.

Working with what is given

is an important step in every scientific investigation.
Freud maintains, "Anyone thus breaking away from the
determination of natural phenomena ... has thrown over the
whole scientific outlook on the world (Weltanschauung) .6
He substantiates this attitude by referring to the
religious outlook on the world and how it is more
articulate than the attitude of a scientist who believes
that physical science is the only form of scientific
knowledge, "One may point out to him how much more
consistent is the religious outlook on the world, which
emphatically assures us that not one sparrow shall fall to
5.

Adam Morton, "Freudian Commonsense," in Philosophical
Essays on Freud, ed. Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 70.

6.

S. Freud, Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 27.
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the ground except God wills it. 11 7
Slips
Experiences such as "slip of the tongue" or "slip of
the pen" are a kind of such recurrent natural phenomenon
which show slight "disturbances" and "inaccuracies" of the
mental performance.

Usually they happen when a person is

"tired," "excited" or the person's intentions are
"absorbed" in other things such as wishes, hopes, desires,
etc ...•

In "The Psychology of Errors" Freud uses the works

of the two philologists Meringer and Mayer to identify
these slips.

The distortions are differentiated as 1)

interchanges, 2) anticipations, 3) perseverations, 4)
compoundings, and 5) substitutions.

In the same essay

Freud gives an example to each one of these slips.
Interchanges - the hotel-boy knocking at the bishop's
door, nervously replied to the question "who is it?"
"The Lord, my boy.118
Anticipations - "the thought lies heartily" instead
of: "the thought lies heavily on my heart. 119
Perseveration - "A member of the House of Commons
referred to another as the 'honourable member for
Central Hell,' instead of 'Hull. 111 10
7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid., p. 31.

9.

Ibid.

10.

Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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Compounding - A gentleman asks a lady if he may
"insort" her on her way instead of "escort" her.11
Substitutions - "Amongst those present was His
Highness the Clown Prince" instead of the "Crown
Princen12
According to Freud, unconscious mental processes seek to
find their purposeful expressions.

In other words, what is

absent to the conscious mind disrupts it and makes itself
present in a disguised way.

From this we come to

understand that there is "meaning" behind what seems to be
unintelligible.

The meaning lies in the "intentionality"

or the "tendency" of the mental processes.

As we have

already observed, a person shows a tendency to say the
opposite of what is to be said.

As such we can also assume

the position that there is in the core of the human psyche
a readiness for self-correctiveness or a tendency for
negations.

In other words, there lies a tendency for an

unconscious honesty.
Dreams
The difficult theory of dreams shows the impasse Freud
faced in connection with the scientifc circles of his time.
During those hard times, researchers concerned themselves
with the object of dreams only for the purpose of
explaining and interpreting their "physiological theories."
11.

Ibid., p. 32.

12.

Ibid., p. 30.
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philosophers like Wundt and Jodl, as Freud refers to them
in his "Difficulties and Preliminary Approach to the
subject," concerned themselves not with dream
interpretations but with descriptions of how dreams diverge
from the waking life.13 This divergence show itself in the
suspending of the critical judgment of the person.

In

spite of this impasse, Freud pursued his search for the
hidden meaning which lies within this natural phenomenon of
sleep.
Freud believes not only in the perseverance of
scientific research but also in the perseverance of the
wisdom inherited throughout the ages.

For Freud, a true

scientific method contains the use of all forms of
knowledge as given to us in the assumptions of science,
philosophy, mythology, literature, traditions, etc ....
"Let us adopt the assumption of the ancients and of simple
folk, and follow in the footsteps of the dream-interpreters
of old. 11 14

In this sense, Freud uses what has become of

rudimentary knowledge as a fertile soil for intellectual
elaborations and explanations.

How?

In tackling dream interpretations he had to clarify
his stand on the notion of sleep.

As mentioned earlier in

the first and the third chapter, sleep is a way of warding
off external reality, i.e., a suspension of the person's
13.

Ibid., p. 78.

14.

Ibid., pp. 78-79.
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interest in the external world.

In this respect, according

to Freud, being in the world is a state of existence which
"unwillingly" happened to us.

But with a lived experience

this world becomes endurable by periodically withdrawing
from it.

So, in order to give meaning to this withdrawal,

he resorts to what is said in everyday life.

For example,

a working person may say at the end of a laborious day,
"Leave me in peace, for I want to sleep. 11 15
of a young child is different.

The response

It seems that Freud was

aware of the difficulties mothers face during the sleeping
time of their children.

A child says, "I won't go to sleep

yet; I'm not tired, I want more things to happen to me1 11 l6
Sleeping is the royal road to dreaming.
the language of sleep.

Dreams are

In order to interpret this

language, Freud also refers to the cultural heritage given
to us on a silver platter.

In other words, Freud uses what

people in their everyday life understand without being
formally taught anything about it.

In "Symbolism in

Dreams", he maintains, "we derive our knowledge from widely
different sources: from fairy tales, and myth, jokes and
witticisms, from folklore, i.e. from what we know of
manners and customs, sayings and songs, of different
peoples, and from poetic and colloquial usage of

15.

Ibid., p. 79.

16.

Ibid.
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ianguage. 11 17

So in the use of these different sources, we

notice how parallel the content of these sources is to
dream symbolisms.

In the same essay, Freud gives us the

evidence.
The human body is usually symbolized in a dream by a
house.

This is to say, windows, doors, and gates are

symbols of entrances to cavities in .the human body.

Freud

uses colloquial expressions to prove his point, e.g. saying
someone who is not quite right that he is living in the
"upper storey."
to as "portals."

or, the openings of the body are referred
Moreover, he makes use of proverbs in·

order to prove the same point, such as referring to a woman
with a "developed bust": "She has plenty of wood in front
of her house" (Die hat viel Holz vor dem Hause) .18
Freud's intellectual excellence goes deeper than the
use of sayings as evidences of proofs.

He oftentimes

refers to the etymology of words in order to uncover the
hidden meaning of a word.

For throughout history, words

have undergone different transformations without losing
their essential meaning.

With such a context we come to

realize why "wood" comes to be a symbol of a woman or a
mother.

For Freud, Holz (wood) is derived from a Greek

word which means raw material.

He compares the German word

with how it came to be in Latin and later in Portuguese.
17.

Ibid., p. 142.

18.

Ibid.

I

p. 142.
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The latter shows that "madeira" means wood which is a
modified version of the Latin word "materia" which means
material in general.

In the same framwork "materia" comes

from the word "mater" which means mother who conceives and
gives birth.19
So the "dream work" undergoes the same
transformational process as language in the process of
cultural usage.

This means that the unconscious wants and

wishes retain their urge for self-expression.

But due to

the resistance of the "censor" the original meaning which
expresses itself in different shapes and forms waiting to
be deciphered.

In "The Dream Work" he says,

But the peculiar thing about the way in which the
dream-work proceeds is this: its material
consists of thoughts, some of which may be
objectionable ••• , but which nevertheless are
correctly formed and expressed.

The dreamwork

transmutes these thoughts into another form, and
it is curious and incomprehensible that in this
process of translation - of rendering them, as it
were, into another script or language - the means
of blending and combining are employed.20
In addition to the different derivations which unfold in
the process, there lies a sort of "ambivalence."
19.

Ibid., pp. 144-45.

20.

Ibid., p. 153.

This
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means that in a certain aspect of language formation the
word carries within itse,lf its own opposite.

Freud gives

us these examples:
1.

2.

Latin:
altus

= high or deep

sacer

=

German:
stimme

3.

sacred or accursed

=

voice, stumm

=

dumb

English:
Without: "with" has the "signification" of
"adding to" and to "depriving of. 11 21

Persons
Freud's characterization of people he encountered in a
clinical setting and in everyday life situations shows his
remarkable ability to use common sense description.

His

description is designed in such a way that none of these
persons is to be looked at as strange or weird no matter
what the sickness was.

It is as if Freud wants to give us

the impression that behind these common sense descriptions
lies a great power of psychological insight informally
developed in a cultural setting.
Freud's writings?

How is this evident in

To answer this question two examples are

going to be considered:

one from a clinial setting and

another from an average life situation.
latter.
21.

Ibid., p. 159.

We start with the
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In the third chapter we showed how Freud describes
Sophie's son as a "good boy."

In this respect, it is

evident in the literature that Freud does not resort to a
conceptual analysis as it is argued in R. Straughan's book
can We Teach Children to be Good? of what it means to be a
"good boy."

Freud simply encourages the use of what is

normally considered as a good boy.

Sophie's son might have

broken his mother's vase, but this does not make him a bad
boy neither to his parents nor to Freud nor to his
neighbors.

In other words, the general perspectives in

virtue of the boy's behavior dilute his wrong doing and
make it normal to a boy of his age.
son is a good boy.

All in all Sophie's

Freud's intellectual observation shows

how this little boy was mastering in a playful way the
tragedy of separation from the mother; and in virtue of
this activity this boy is leading himself to a good life;
and therefore, he is a good boy.

This is to say, this boy

performed his first "civilized" act.

Intuitively, we come

to grasp the significance of the validity of this
commonsensical description.

It shows that there is a

perspective guided by its context -- practice and
experience -- and systematically developed with an informal
and insightful flexibility.

In our colloquial language we

describe a person who possesses this quality as a person
who "knows what's what."
Now, let us move to a situation in which Freud
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characterizes a woman who caused an embitterment to her
family by her nonsensical ideas.

In his "Psycho-Analysis

and Psychiatry" Freud describes her as follows:
I found her a well-preserved lady, fifty three
years old of age, of a friendly, simple
disposition, who gave without hesitation (an]
account of herself.

She is most happily married

and lives in the country with her husband who
manages a large factory.

She cannot say enough

of her husband's kindness and consideration .... 22
In spite of his complicated theory of personality, Freud
describes this woman in a way which makes her
"intelligible" as a person.

He introduces her in terms of

manners as a person we should know with certain lasting
characteristics rather than the way she appears in a
clinical situation, i.e. the temporary attacks of jealousy.
What Freud is trying to convey is that a person's
"character" traits are more rooted than some transient
neurotic attacks.

This means that after therapy she falls

back on what was a stronghold in her style of action, i.e.,
"friendly" with "simple disposition."

This is to say, she

falls back on her modesty, kindness, and other virtues
which constitute her character.

These character traits

refer to a system of values prized by her culture, and
Freud does not hesitate to articulate these values in his
22.

Ibid.

I

p. 221.
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intellectual pursuit.
Now let us pose this question: What are the virtues
implied as Freud tackles some major issues in
psychoanalysis?

We would like to remind the reader that we

do not intend to emphasize the virtues in Freud's
character.

What we really intend to emphasize is how

psychoanalysis, the product of Freud's thought, is a school
of thought in which the virtues are descriptively implied.
Considering this, let us begin with the virtue of
"high-mindedness" or "magnanimity" as discussed in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

One of its main

characteristics is that "magnanimity seems, even going by
the name alone, to be concerned with great things. 11 23

In

spite of his early concern in the physiological
understanding of the human self Freud never concealed from
his close friend Fliess that philosophy was his main
objective.

Thomas Nagel in his essay "Freud's

Anthropomorphism," quotes Freud,
I see that you are using the circuitous route of
medicine to attain your first ideal, the
physiological understanding of man, while I
secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same
route at my own original objective, philosophy.24
23.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV:3, 1123 & 35.

24.

R. Wollheim, Philosophical Essays on Freud, citing
Thomas Nagel, 11 Freud's Anthropomorphism, " p. 2 2 9. ·
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And what is greater than wisdom, the sole search of
philosophy and the desired "love" of a philosopher?
Moreover, the scope of magnanimity according to
Aristotle is "honour" which is qualified as "the prize for
the finest (achievements]." 2 5

To ask the question about

these finest achievements Freud honoured and diligently
used, the answer is in what we already discussed in this
section, namely, traditions as they are implied in fairy
tales, the proverbs of the common people, the mythologies
of ancient cultures, the insights of the religious
traditions, the understanding and reasoning of philosophy
and mathematics, and finally, the methods of the physical
sciences.

At the extreme level Freud did not hesitate to

make "great claims" in order to reflect the "worth" of his
attitudes, discoveries, challenges and contributions.

If

pronouncing his "great claims" and giving "worth" to his
discoveries are "rightly" done, then he is an
"intermediate" in Aristotle's language.

This is because of

"what he thinks he is worthy of reflects his real worth,
while the others are excessive or deficient. 11 26
But for things to be rightly done persons need to be
committed and "faithful" to their convictions.

These

characteristics imply a sense of confidence which is rooted
in the virtue of courage.

In the Rhetoric, Artistotle

25.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV:3, 1123b, 19-20.

26.

Aristotle, NE, IV:3, 1123b 13-15.
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defines confidence as "the hope accompanied by a mental
image, of things conducive to safety as being near at hand,
while causes of fear seem to be either non-existent or far
away.

Confidence is inspired both by the remoteness of

calamities and by the proximity of sources of
encouragement. 11 27

What concerns us in this definition is

the notion of safety as it is related to courage and
confidence.

This means that persons should utilize all

available resources to defend themselves as well as to
defend their ideas.

In this connection, it is evident how

Freud brought psychoanalysis as a new language to this
present century.

Using his already mentioned resources, he

also brought a new method to hermeneutics;28 he articulated
the language of science and mysticism with
psychoanalysis;29 and he contributed new perspective to
morality and ethics.JO

With such high quality achievements

it is very difficult to deny the confidence, courage and
faithfulness which armed his character.
27.

Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. Lane Cooper (New York: D.
Appleton and Company, 1932), 11:5, 1383A.

28.

For a detailed discussion of this matter see Paul
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970), pp. 37-56.

29.

For a detailed discussion of this matter see David
Bakan, "Science, Mysticism and Psychoanalysis,"
Catholic Psychological Record, Vol. 4 (Spring 1966),
1-9.

30.

For a detailed discussion of this matter see Heinz
Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (New York:
International Universities Press, 1960).
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To conclude this section, Freud's use of common sense
as a device and evidence is understood in connection with
other forms of knowledge.

He interlocks different

disciplines, stretches them out and strives for clarity,
demonstration, explanation and differentiation.

He relates

and embraces what is considered as opposites, and puts them
in a context nourished by practice and experience which
guides understanding to the enigmatic world of the mind.
Having this reconciliatory style, Freud teaches us the
appreciation of great things not only as something worth
having, but something we already possess as people who
belong to a culture and able to stretch out to other
cultures.

In order to retain and value what we have we

need faithfulness; a quality rooted in confidence· and
courage.

In other words, being-in-the-world a person needs

the building of character; and the vehicle is the building
of the virtues.
Our purpose is not to go in details on those issues.
Suffice to say that in Freud's thought there is an
articulation between what has become a comon sense
knowledge with what is intellectual.

Both alter each other

as if Freud, for practical reasons, employs principles
derived from common sense as well as principles derived
from intellectual scientific investigation.

He artfully

alternates them to make psychoanalysis intuitively as well
as rationally intelligible.
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Section Two

Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied,
And vice sometime's by action dignified.
Within the infant rind of the weak flower
Poison hath residence and medicine power;
For this, being smelt, with that part cheers each
part;
Being tasted, slays all sense with the heart.
Two such opposed foes encamp them still
In man as well as herbs, grace and rude will,
And where the worser is predominant,
Full soon the canker death eats up that plant.
--Shakespeare
Romeo and Juliet,
Act II, Sc. III
Two important notions are going to be considered in
this section: psychopathology and the theory of cure as
Freud introduces them in his psychoanalytic literature.
Since our purpose is the notion of virtue as it is
descriptively implied in psychoanalysis, we are going to
try to explore the general framework by which Freud and
Aristotle's perspectives can be articulated.

This is to

say, we are going to consider the disposition which makes a
human being capable of functioning well.

Considering this,

we need to remind ourselves that functioning well is a
matter of degree.
To begin with, let us consider Aristotle's general
definition of virtue.

In his Ethics, Aristotle says,

Our proposition, then ... enables us to say that

141
virtue in a man will be the disposition which (a)
makes him a good man,

(b) enables him to perform

his function well."31
It is evidently clear that for Aristole living a good life
is synonymous to living a virtuous life.

The question we

would like to pose is, how can we see in Freud's
understanding of psychopathology this disposition which
enables a person to "perform his function well?"
Psychopathology
To a large extent we can consider Freud a
dialectician.

Having a look at the structure of the psyche

we cannot but observe the "antithetic" intentions of the
agents, thanks to the temperate state of the ego which
exercises a control over the distressing promptings of the
id and the superego.

Using the appropriate resources, the

ego from time to time rightly suppresses these distressing
promptings in order to retain a certain degree of
confidence.
But in certain situations this confidence is weakened
as it becomes overriden by these "antithetic ideas" and
gives in to an unbalanced struggle of the extreme demands
of the id, superego, and the external world.

This

stressful situation leads a person to situations of
31.

Christian Hoff Sommers, Vice and Virtue in Evervday
Life (New York: Harcourt, Jovanovich, 1985), p. 148,
citing Artistotle, "The Moral Virtues" from the Ethics
of Aristotle, trans. J.A.K. Thompson, George Allen &
Unwin Publishers, p. 150.
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uncertainty, fear and anxiety accompanied by an inner
desire to recreate the lost balance.

How?

By sending a

message to the external world called "symptom."
this tell us?

What does

It tells us that there is a sort of

"intelligence" in the psyche which enables the psyche to
perform its function well by disclosing a "compromise"
achieved by all the agents in a form of a "symptom."
In the second chapter we mentioned that according to
Philip Rieff, psychonalysis teaches us the virtue of
compromise and the virtue of prudence.
understand this perspective?

How do we

Briefly we will sketch how

the process of compromise takes place.

In the Ego and the

Id, Freud maintains that neurosis is rooted in an
unresolved Oedipal complex.32

Having in mind the mechanism

of "compulsion to repeat 11 33 as Freud exposes it in details
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the repressed material,
e.g., "I want to get rid of my father" has never been
sublimated or anticathected.

The individual continues to

repress these murderous wishes by using energy from the ego
and the superego.

This is to say, the id lustfully desires

and the superego counteracts these wishes with a tyrannous
"Thou shalt not."

These antithetic intentions confront

each other at the unconscious level.

With both mechanisms

32.

S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans J. Riviere (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1962), p. 15.

33.

S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. J.
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1959), p. 9.
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the "return of the repressed" and the "compulsion to
repeat" the promptings of these repressed wishes come close
to invade the boundaries of the conscious mind.
As these opposed intentions -- id desiring and the
superego commanding -- keep straining each other the
individual starts to experience a break-down in the defense
mechanism.

Consequently, this conflict has to show itself

in a way not known to the conscious ego, and the process of
"compromise" starts to maneuver itself.

This means that

the three agents reach an agreement by which each one
obtains a certain satisfaction.

This agreement is

expressed in a physical symptom.
The significance of this compromise lies in the fact
that a murder does not happen.

In the same context the

superego punishes the person with the physical symptom and
the unconscious ego uses this disturbance in order to gain
the affection of the desired object, the mother.
A resolution such as this shows how the extreme wishes
of the id and the extreme commands of the superego give in
to an extreme compromise called neurosis.

In other words,

the individual experiences an extreme-mean, i.e. a less
extreme function to perform a less dangerous act.

In our

understanding, the purpose of this compromise is the
expression of the inner conflict which shows itself in the
form of psychological illness.

It is an unconscious

"prudent" expression of a tactful manifestation of the
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psyche.

For example, having a paralyzed arm is better than

committing a murder.

How similar this is to the biblical

saying about lusting which states that it is better for a
person to pluck his eye out rather than his or her whole
body burn in the eternal fire of hell.

What seems to have

happened on the unconscious level is a comparison between
most extreme consequences, i.e. putting the promptings of
the desire into action -- killing the father, or the choice
of falling sick.

Obviously, the latter is chosen.

What becomes evident in this discussion is that for
Freud, building the virtues is a process with a muddy
trail.

The process of conscious deliberation as Aristotle

teaches us is, in Freud's perspective, paralyzed by these
inner unconscious disruptions.

This implies that the

unconscious "structure" is not taken into account by
Aristotle.

As W. Richardson puts it, "Here, indeed, one

must admit the discovery of something specifically new by
Freud that does affect profoundly the field of ethics.n34
Also, R. Audi says that persons have conscious beliefs and
wants as well as unconscious ones.

In the same line, we

assume that persons have a sort of unconscious
deliberation.

This must not surprise us since, according

to Freud, part of the ego is linked to the unconscious.

34.

William Richardson, "Ethics and Desire," paper
delivered at a meeting of the Society for
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Loyola
University of Chicago, 1986.

In
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other words, the interrelated activities of the agents of
the psyche facilitate and give way to such an unconscious
constellation of mental activities.

This perspective shows

that Freud's contribution to the field of ethics is the
existence of unconscious virtues by which the psyche
desires to regain its homeostatic function.
What we already discussed shows that for Freud there
is a deeper underlying discourse (logos); a logos deeply
interconnected with the power of myth.
Oedipus Rex.

The myth is that of

In this regard, logos is confined neither to

consciousness nor to logic.

It allows myth to encompass,

to articulate, to express and to recollect in an enigmatic,
interlocking and elusive way.
reconciles opposites.

It relates, connects and

It desires coherence rather than

fragmentation, expression rather than repression.

The

message sent by the neurotic is an unconscious message to
the conscious minds of the other persons in the external
world.

It says, "I have a problem!

Please help."

Thus, a

compromise which expressed itself in sickness now becomes a
healthy compromise.
external agent.

The latter is facilitated by an

More precisely, there is a deep underlying

structure which performs its function well; and Freud
psychologically explains, analyzes, and demonstrates the
existence of these unconscious performances.
and a vigorous virtue.
deliberation.

It is a vital

It has its own logic and style of

Now, the question we would like to answer
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is, how do we see this process in Freud's theory of cure?
Theory of Cure
The process starts with free-association, reenactments
and then deliberation.
power to articulate.

The purpose is coherence and the
It answers the unconscious message

the neurotic sends to the external world.

How?

The

therapist develops an "insight" into the patient's problem.
Insight becomes the means by which the interplay of
opposites is perceived and understood.

In order to gain

this insight the therapist first employs the technique of
"free association."
In a clinical setting Freud allows the analysands to
speak whatever comes to their minds whether relevant or
irrelevant thoughts.

The reason for employing this

technique lies in the fact that patients come to get
therapy with two opposing motives: the first is to get
help, and the second is to resist therapy,35 as they tend
to be afraid of being discovered.

The technique of free

association helps the patients to relax their resistance by
lowering the level of "censorship.''

These spontaneous

verbal expressions give the psychoanalyst the opportunity
to collect much material until the whole picture falls into
place.

Waiting to build insight into the repressed wishes,

the therapist remains passive using some tactful feedbacks
whenever the patient fails to get started again.
35.

s.

What does

Freud, Standard Edition (London), Vol. II, p. 268.
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this attitude permit us to understand?
By allowing the patients to freely express themselves,
the therapist acts as a watchful testing ego to the reality
of the "upward drive" of the desiring id.

This means that

patients act as if they were id and the therapist takes the
role of the patient's ego in order to deliberate on the
causes of illness.
question.

That said, we would like to pose this

What are the attitudes a therapist must have to

achieve the competency to cure?

To answer this question we

must consider Freud's recommendations on the method of
treatment.

His recommendations cluster around one

important characteristic.
characteristic.
recommendations?

It is the self-controlled

How does he go about these
He goes about them by emphasizing that

therapists must not exceed their means nor impose on the
patients what is not within their capacity.
The first recommendation given is that a therapist
must avoid the excess of attention on the patient's
problem; for
one begins to select from the material before
one; one point will be fixed in the mind with
particular clearness and some other consequently
disregarded, and in this selection one's
expectations and one's inclinations will be
followed.36
36.

s.

Freud, Collected Paper, Vol. II, p. 324.
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What Freud is suggesting is an "evenly-hovering attention."
rt is this sort of attention which makes meaning
recognizable not on the spur of the moment, but later.
This is to say that, for Freud, one has to listen without
being troubled by the efforts "to keep in mind anything in
particular.n37

By this attitude the therapist allows the

"unconscious memory" to act in "full play" and also allows
oneself to give way to any emerging surprises.

With such

an attitude the therapeutic session comes to possess a high
degree of freedom from the biases and the expectations of
the therapist.

This is why Freud advocates that therapists

must undergo psychoanalysis in order to exercise selfcontrol over their complexes and resistances.

More

precisely, he advocates that the therapist must possess an
"approximate normality."

Freud maintains,

Whoever knows how to appreciate the high value of the
self-knowledge and increase in self-control so
acquired will afterwards continue the analytic
examination of his own personality by a self-analysis,
and willingly recognize that, in himself as in others,
he must always expect to find something new.38
Self-control is exercised in the clinical setting by not
getting "too intimate" with the patient.

The therapist

should be like a mirror which reflects what is projected on
37.

Ibid., p. 325.

38.

Ibid., p. 325.
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it.

But using the expression "too intimate" does not mean

for Freud not to "afford" the patient glimpses of the
therapist's defects and misgivings.

On the contrary, the

relationship must be given a moderate intimacy.

Freud

says, "One confidence repays another, and anyone demanding
intimate revelations from another must be prepared to make
them himself. 11 39
In addition to this moderate and intimate exchange the
therapist should "restrain himself and take the patient's
capacities rather than his own wishes as his standard. 11 40
Ambitiousness, for Freud, is an undesirable element.

,

Patients should be respected for their weaknesses and for
their "moderate worth."

They should not feel compelled to

go beyond their natural capacity.
All in all, we notice that Freud mostly considers what
is conducive to health.

He urges students of

psychoanalysis to assume a self-controlled and a moderate
attitude.

What goes beyond the natural means of the person

is considered by Freud as unhealthy.

How similar is

Freud's position to Aristotle's definition of the selfcontrolled person:
If something is pleasant and conducive to health or
fitness, he will desire this moderately and in the
right way; and he will desire in the way anything else
39.

Ibid.

40.

Ibid., p. 331.

I

p. 330.
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that is pleasant if it is no obstacle to health and
fitness, does not deviate from what is fine, and does
not exceed his means.41
with such recommendations it becomes evident that acquiring
insight into the patient's problem depends on a moderate
and a prudent clinical relationship between the patient and
the therapist.

This shows the importance of the communal

aspects of psychoanalysis.

Interdependence is necessary

for building the autonomy of the individual.

For this

reason abstract intellectuality does not override the
personal experience in the world.
position.

Freud defends this

He says,

I dislike resorting to analytical writings as an
aid to patients; I require them to learn by
personal experience, and I assure them that in
this way they will acquire wider and more
valuable knowledge than the whole literature of
psycho-analysis could afford them.42
Exercising the proper practice and experience, the
therapist out of a "calm" and a "quiet" attentiveness"
develops in a later time the insight proper into the
client's problem.

Having this insight at hand, the time is

ripe to provide it to the patient.
The principal point is that I should guess the secret
41.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 1119a, 17-20.

42.

s.

Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 333.
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and tell it to the patient straight out; and he is
then as a rule obliged to abandon his rejection of
it.43
This insightful feedback given to the analysand by the
therapist becomes the possession of the client.

The

reality testing ego restores its articulating power.

This

fruitful relationships shows another important point in
psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis being faithful to its

premise that the human being is a social creature teaches
us that there is an underlying unity in what is considered
to be separate.
From all that has been discussed in this section we
need to ask this question: what does psychoanalysis teach
us about character?

We notice that self-control is

exercised in order to get the best out of the client, i.e.,
"honesty"; honesty about what the client wants to say and
also honesty about what the client resists saying.

To get

honesty out of another person for healthy purposes means
that the person concerned is not being exploited, but
helped in developing an awareness for a basic strategy for
adaptation and for survival on virtuous foundations.

But,

in order to be a helper, one must have certain character
traits by which he is distinguished from other types of
personalities.

How can we detect this character trait?

In the second chapter we used the insights of Jody
43.

S. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. II, p. 281.
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Palmour in drawing the parallel between Aristotle's
"generous man" with Freud's "genital man."

Having this

similarity at our disposal we would like to resume our
investigation in order to show that being a helper is the
power in the character behind the "generous man."

In this

regard, we will come to conclude that psychoanalysis
teaches us the virtue of being a helper.

Aristotle defines

the generous man:
Whatever has a use can be used either well or badly;
riches are something useful; and the best user of
something is the person who has the virtue concerned
with it.

Hence the best user of riches will be the

person who has the virtue concerned with wealth; and
this is the generous person.44
Although generosity is concerned with the proper dealing
with wealth, one must not overlook the fact that the more a
person tends to be generous, the more this virtue fits the
mold of a more general framework of virtues.

A generous

person "will give to the right people, the right amounts,
at the right time, and all the other things that are
implied by correct giving. 114 5

The general mold is that a

generous person could be "prudent," "temperate" and "just."
This is to say that a generous person gives for the purpose
of promoting the proper development of the taker that he or
44.

Aristotle, Ethics, IV, 1120a, 5-9.

45.

Ibid., pp. 25-29.
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she might become virtuous.

Aristotle says

For it is more proper to virtue to do good than
to receive good, and more proper to do fine
actions than not to do shameful ones; and clearly
[the right sort of] giving implies doing good and
doing fine actions ..•• 46
That said, we find that a temperate character with a
generous character in action forms a constellation of deeds
which renders help to the person concerned and to others.
In other words, a virtuous person is the one who tactfully
helps with a benevolent attitude and with refined manners.
This is parallel and articulate with how a proper helpful
relationships is built in a psychoanalytic session.
Our discussion about developing an insight into the
patient's problem shows that deliberation on the part of
the therapist takes place.

We also come to realize that

tqe therapist deliberates on what is to be the cause of the
problem.

In this process the therapist takes over or

adopts the patient's ego in order to choose what is really
linked to the problem as the patient discloses in a free
situation.

In other words, there are efforts on the part

of the therapist to find an answer to the question of how
the patient acts in response to his or her desire.

This

question brings us closer to Aristotle's stand in regard to
the object of choice.
46.

Ibid., pp. 12-15.
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We have found, then, that what we decide to do is
whatever action among those up to us we
deliberate about and desire to do.

Hence also

decision will be deliberative desire to do an
action that is up to us; for when we have judged
[that it is right] as a result of deliberation,
our desire to do it expresses our wish.47
In chapter two we discussed that the notion of desire is a
common for Freud and Aristotle.

But in our understanding,

psychoanalysis reveals to us two orders of desire: first,
the unrequited desire, i.e., the desire for the mother as a
lost object, and secondly, the desire which the message of
illness sends, i.e., the desire of the ego to regain its
diplomatic artful role between the two masters and the
external world.

The similarity between Freud and Aristotle

lies in what facilitates the "art" of living.

For both

Aristotle and Freud, we come to desire in accord with our
deliberation.

This is the sole function of the ego and the

purpose of psychotherapy.
Our aim will not be to rule off every peculiarity
of human character for the sake of a schematic
"normality," nor yet to demand that the person
who has been "thoroughly analyzed" shall feel no
passions and develop no internal conflicts.

The

business of the analysis is to secure the best
47.

Aristotle, Ethics, III, 1113a, 10-15.
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possible psychological conditions for the
functions of the ego ..• 48
What is really obvious in Freud's position is that the
desire for the lost object will never stop its pursuit of
its object.

But what is really the crucial issue in this

matter is what is conducive to health, moderately desired
and in the right way; for too much id desiring is extreme
sickness, too much of the laws of the superego is also an
extreme sickness.

What is really conducive to health is

the mean reached upon the deliberation of the ego.

This

means settling down for what is realistic and healthy.
But to achieve the crucial aim of analysis by securing
the best possible conditions for the functions of the ego,
the usual free-association techniques will not suffice.
we have seen, it is a technique by which the client
spontaneously reports relevant or irrelevant thoughts.
This disclosure may help in developing the therapist's
insight into the patient's problem, but it is not
sufficient for achieving the cure pursued by analysis.
Why?
Having in mind the conflicting and disruptive powers
of the agents of the psyche, we come to realize that the
free-association technique is also disrupted by an
unconscious resistance which Freud described as a process
of regression to the unconscious regions of the mind.
48.

s.

Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 250.
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Whenever in our analytic delving we come upon one
of the hiding-places of the withdrawn libido,
there ensues a battle; all the forces which have
brought about regression of the libido will rise
up as resistance against our efforts in order to
maintain the new condition.49
It is a mechanism which accompanies every step of the
treatment.
Every step of the treatment is accompanied by
resistance; every single thought, every mental
act of the patient's must pay 'toll to the
resistance, and represent a compromise between
the forces urging towards cure and those gathered
to oppose it.50
Here the picture comes to be clear that resistance is the
process which interrupts the progress of the therapeutic
session.

It also shows the "ambivalence" the patient

carries to the analytic session.

What emerges next?

According to Freud, the exploration done by the
analyst as it conflicts with the resisting unconscious
urges of the patient brings the flow of free-association to
cessation.

Entering into this scene, resistance draws out

one of its own "weapons" which Freud calls "transference."
Transference is the mechanism by which the analysand
49.

s.

50.

Ibid.

Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, p. 316.
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"merges the physician with the object of his emotions. 11 51
How does this serve our investigation?
In the second chapter we discussed that one of the
common places between Freud and Aristotle is the notion of
"activity" which, according to Aristotle, is considered the
heart of virtue.

For example, a person may act

courageously without knowing the conceptual analysis of
courage.

In this connection, the phenomenon of

transference is the process by which the analysand
unconsciously acts out the buried vile and unpleasant
wishes and brings them out to the open.

The question to be

addressed is, how are these vile and unpleasant wishes
related to an act of virtue?
In our understanding, the virtuous act in this acting
out lies in its disclosure.

It is this disclosure that

really does help the analysis to lead to a fruitful result,
i.e., the possible conditions for the proper functions of
ego which lead to a proper conscious deliberation
concerning the object of choice.

We can also express this

position in the language of the following middle-eastern
proverb which says that one cannot tame a beast without
catching it.

This is exactly what the analyst tries to do.

Freud comments on the importance of transference.

He says,

As we raise the transference by making it
conscious we detach only these two components of
51.

Ibid.

I

p. 318.
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the emotional relationship from the person of the
physician; the conscious and unobjectionable
component of it remains, and brings about the
successful result in psycho-analysis .... 52
Freud continued to assert the values of the results of
psychoanalysis as they pertain to health.
social in their nature.

These values are

The autonomy of the person is

achieved by being an interdependent being.

This is to say

that in the therapeutic session the patients' selfknowledge is obtained by another.

Freud expresses the goal

of therapy as follows,
The eventual independence of the patient is our
ultimate object when we use suggestion to bring
him to carry out a mental operation that will
necessarily result in a lasting improvement in
his mental conditions.53
In order to obtain this independence the analyst puts
certain rational requirements on the analysands.

First,

their perturbed emotions should fit into their lifehistory, and second, subject them to rational
considerations and evaluate them at "their true psychical
values. 11

The transference manifestation proves to be the

battle field on which the struggle of opposing forces takes
place.

It also proves to be a means of uncovering that

52.

Ibid., p. 319.

53.

Ibid., pp. 319-20.
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which should be tamed by the power of reason.
This struggle between physician and patient,
between intellect and the forces of instinct,
between recognition and the striving to
discharge, is fought out almost entirely over the
transference-manifestations.

This is the ground

on which the victory must be won, the final
expression of which is lasting recovery from
neurosis.

It is undeniable that the subjugation

of the transference-manifestations provides the
greatest difficulties for the psychoanalyst; but
it must.not be forgotten that they, and they
only, render the invaluable service of making the
patient's buried and forgotten love-emotions
actual and manifest; for in the last resort no
one can be slain in absentia or in effigy.54
Now we would like to pose this question: With what attitude
is the activity of transference to be qualified?
answer is truthfulness.
truthfulness is a virtue.

The

According to Aristotle,
It is the mean between the

booster and the self-deprecator.

Hence, a truthful person

is someone
Who is truthful both in what he says and in how
he lives, when nothing about justice is at stake,
simply because that is his state of character.
54.

Ibid., p. 322.
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Someone with this character seems to be a decent
person.

For a lover of the truth who is truthful

even when nothing is at stake will be still
keener to tell the truth when something is at
stake.55
What we gather from this definition is that truthful people
show sincerity in both deeds and words.
"equitable."

They are

They give us a sense of confidence since they

try neither to exaggerate nor to depreciate.
Relating this characteristic disposition of
truthfulness to what is disclosed in a clinical session, we
notice that seeking for help the client must possess an
inner drive to know about what causes the problem no matter
what is really at stake.

Asking for help from someone

means that people have confidence in the therapists'
truthful suggestions as well as in themselves as they
strive to regain a realistic sense of their world and of
themselves.

In spite of the ambivalence they come with,

this inner drive for truthfulness speaks in free
association and acts out in transference.
Underlying the resistance and the ambivalence of the
patient lies a kind of trust in the therapist who acts
truthfully, diplomatically and intimately.

The therapist

is, like the ego, an artful diplomat in giving the
opportunity for the hidden truth to slip out of the
55.

Aristotle, Ethics, IV, 1127b.
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~idden

client's mouth as well as the opportunity for this
painful truth to be acted out.

Allowing the concerned

impulses the expression they deserve, the therapist uses
all the available material to confidently form the insight
needed for the diagnosis.

Having the insight at hand, the

truth is told and the conscious rational ego steps into a
safer territory to resume his feeble but persistent
function.
Conclusion
What does our discussion of the psychopathology and
the theory of cure allow us to say?

The locus of our

discussion points to the idea that there is an articulation
between what is pathological and what is healthy.

This

articulation presupposes that in every psychological
sickness there is a healthy message sent to the external
world which allows through another the necessary condition
for the restoration of health.

This healthy message is

detected by a certain conscious and unconscious
acknowledgement of the patient that there is something
wrong going on which leads this patient to seek help.
But to deal with such paradoxical situation, i.e.,
pathology speaks health and vice versa, we come to realize
that in the human psyche there are unconscious activities
whose aim is health.

These activities we call unconscious

virtues, e.g., the virtue of compromise, the virtue of
prudence and the virtue of truthfulness.

Moreover, these
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virtues are acted upon consciously by the therapist whom we
considered as possessing the virtue of helping another.

In

order to help another, the therapist must possess the
virtue of self-control as well as the virtue of selfknowledge.

Both are, to some extent, mediated by the link

drawn between the therapist and the client during the
therapeutic session.

It is a link built by many negative

and positive activities, such as, free association,
resistance and transference.

Through the insight gained by

such clinical activities, the patient regains the lost and
the desired "approximate normality."

More precisely,

strengthening the diplomatic functions of the ego is the
sole purpose of psychotherapy.

This is to say, the more

reality testing the less pathology.
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Epilogue
Finally, the question we would like to pose is, what
sense can we make of Freud's interrogation about denial?
More exactly, what is the philosophic perspective we gather
from our investigation?

The route which Freud attempted to

follow is the pathological.

It is in this direction that

Freud's most daring interrogation turned upon
schizophrenia, the most regressive of all pathological
illnesses.

It is also through schizophrenia that Freud

found his way to prove the enigmatic unconscious, and
through its excessive regressive mechanism, he came to
understand denial as a primitive mechanism.
In spite of being a primitive mechanism, absolute
schizophrenia for Freud is an "idee-limite".

This is why

we emphasized in both chapters one and four Freud's general
perspective that whenever there is pathology there is a
hidden tendency for articulation.

In other words, denial

presupposes avowal of the situation denied.

It follows

that the necessity of articulation demands the necessity of
avowal as well as the necessity of denial of the loss which
reality affirms.
This manner of interrelating or joining together poses
the general context of Freud's interrogation.

To

understand this context is to understand Freud's
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philosophical outlook.
to see this context?

With what perspective are we able
The answer lies in the articulation

between the pathological and the normal.

This is to say,

we see it in the underlying implicit articulation between
the normal and the abnormal.

But due to the ambiguity in

Freud's texts precise definitions of the normal and the
pathological are not available.

Then, what?

How can we

allow this ambiguity to feed our purpose in understanding
Freud's underlying philosophical perspective?
In the first chapter we stated that sleep is denial of
the external reality.

Also the psychotic phenomenon of

dreaming is common to the pathological as well as to the
normal.

What we come to understand is that the normal and

the pathological are interrelated in a dialectical fashion.
It is also worth noting that Freud came to understand the
normal from explicating the pathological.

In chapter four

we mentioned that Freud recommends that a therapist does
not have to be fully healthy; a therapist must have an
"approximate" health.

So, it is in terms of the dialectic

that Freud comes to understand normality.

Normality in a

person is that which combines certain neurotic and
psychotic features.

This is fully understood in the

purpose he prescribes to therapy; i.e., the well
functioning of the ego as it faces the disruptions of the
id, the superego and the external world.

Even in the most

extreme psychological illnesses we find that the tendency
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lands safely on the right track.

So, what really gives

meaning is neither the normal nor the pathological
considered separately, but as they are conducive to the
dialectic process.
It is in relation to this context that denial could be
considered as that which ruins, i.e., vice.

It is a vice

because the dialectic process which articulates, moderates,
interlocks, and gives the hidden implicit meaning is
disturbed by the excessive or deficient manifestation of
denial.

It is in the dialectic that we come to understand

that, in case of illness, what is normally considered
healthy becomes hidden and unseen.

This is to say, that

when vice is overriding there is an unconscious virtuous
activity which intends to recover the lost harmony.
What does this dialectic process mean for persons as
beings-in-the-world?

It is that progressive movement which

is concerned with becoming.

It leads persons from what

they are to what they are meant to become.

It encompasses

a "totality" in which people experience that which is
explicitly present and also that which is implicitly
present somewhere, i.e., they experience "presence-absence"
as well as "absence-presence."
discussed in chapter three.

This is the kernel point we

It is the notion of separation

which signifies the human presence in the world.

In the

same chapter we came to conclude that denial of separation
means denial of relationships.

The person regresses to a
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stage where the external world, to a large extent, is
warded off; a condition which satisfies the infantile I,
i.e., "I am it" rather than "I am not it."
Acknowledging the separation is the first achievement
by which persons relate to what is external to themselves.
This includes culture, institutions and persons.

It is

through separation that they become related to a world
which they acknowledge as an entity out there.
has its own communal demands.

This world

It robs people of their

individuality; and it is through this world that
individuals search and refined themselves as independent or
autonomous individuals.

It is similar to the relationship

the therapist develops with the patient.

This is also well

expressed in the biblical tradition which emphasizes that
one must lose himself or herself in order to find it.

In

the language of psychoanalysis what is found is only found
as something that was lost.
Finding oneself in an indeterminate world with a
multitude of beings, the "split" or the separation from
others is what really "defines" the person as a social
being who acts not only as a separate individual, but as a
separate individual who is linked by the dialectic movement
to the "totality" to which he or she is open as a means for
self fulfillment.

While people avow their individuality,

in the same movement they deny it as they tend to encounter
the world in its totality.

It is a to and fro movement.
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Appropriate as it is, this to and fro movement makes
of denial a part of the dialectic which leads to
articulation.

But this should not divert us from our

consideration of denial as vice as discussed in the second
chapter.

Since the dialectic process is what gives the

underlying meaning of what are considered opposites, or
implicit and explicit, or conscious and unconscious, denial
as vice is subjugated to this dialectical process by
evoking that which functions well to make the person as a
person with a link to other beings; and, consequently, to
the world as a totality in general.

It is separateness

which is presupposed in order to establish the link with
another.

That said, separation becomes the signification

of being-in-the-world.
This general dialectic process is what enhances the
individuals'
death.

prog~essive

walk towards their inevitable

It is not regressive as it is observed in

schizophrenia.

It is what really articulates opposites,

e.g., the regressive psychotic mechanism of sleep as it is
connected to the progressive activities of our everyday
life.

This, according to Freud, proves that absolute

normality or absolute pathology is a "cas-limite."

Within

this context we come to understand Paul Ricoeur's
description of psychoanalysis as a new language; a language
which conceals that which is revealed in it and vice versa:
implicit/explicit, conscious/unconscious, hidden/manifest,

169

pathological/normal, real/unreal 1 • logical/illogical,
known/unknown etc.

It is a language which feeds and is fed

by ambiguity, understood dialectically and comprehended in
its progressive revelation.
As much as this dialectical process is actualized the
human being is, according to Lacan, the "discourse of the
other. 11 56

Being as such, the person is open to a

"totality" which is revealed as absent/present; a reality
which conceals in order to reveal and vice versa.

Guided

by this context the human development is understood as a
discourse between the pathological and the normal.

Human

nature, as we understand Freud's outlook, is patho/logical.
The early loss the inf ant experiences is primarily a
traumatic incident to be avowed; an avowal for which the
infant as a growing being is expected to pay a high price.
This is understood in terms of suffering the unrequited
desire for the lost object, i.e., the mother.

As a result

of avowing this inevitable traumatic situation, the infant
is recognized by another and also, growing to be a child,
he or she is bound to recognize the other.

Only through

this tragedy, according to Freud, does the infant become a
social being.

In the peek-a-boo game the child comes to

reconcile himself or herself to this tragedy-absent/present.
56.

In this situation the child does not

Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psycho-Analysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1981), p. 170.
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impart knowledge, nor tries to inform, but "evokes" a
relationship with another.

This also applies to the "Fort-

da" game through which the child evokes a relationship with
what is absent/present.

In this regard, a language is not

only a vehicle of information, but an instrument to evoke
relationship whether in words or in actions.

More exactly,

language is the acknowledgement of another; and by the fact
of this acknowledgement the child steps into a community of
humans.
Within this context we considered denial in its
extreme or less extreme case as vice.

The schizophrenic or

the neurotic refuses to acknowledge the tragedy of
separation, and in the same line refuses to acknowledge
himself or herself as a person belonging to a community of
humans. In the state of a pathological denial the world
does not exist independently of oneself because that which
overrides his or her being is a regressive rather than a
progressive movement, i.e., the triumph of the pleasure
principle.
What Freud invites us to understand is that living the
drama of life needs endurance.

Endurance is achieved by

building the character; a character neither dominated by
the laws of morality nor the blind desires of the id.
Freud implies the art of living which is acquired by
practice and experience.
What makes us endure?

What is the form that shapes
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practice and experience?

The answer to these questions is

the building of the virtues.

By the virtues we build

proper relationships and also by the virtues we bravely
succeed and we bravely fail.

Learning the virtues as we

already implied in our investigation is by formal or
informal teaching; a teaching which is primarily achieved
by "relationship", not only by passing on information.
Psychoanalysis is never considered by Freud an
educational theory for the classroom.

But, undoubtedly, it

is educational if we consider the assumption that Rousseau
gives us which says that the best educated person is the
one who lives the joys and the sorrows of life.
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